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ABSTRACT 
This Article examines the recent evolution of the EU anti-money-laundering 
(AML) and counter-terrorist ﬁnancing (CTF) legislative framework, focusing 
on the relationship between the main international standards in the ﬁeld and the 
newest EU legislation. It suggests that international soft law norms—in 
particular, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations—have 
had a decisive inﬂuence on the latest development of legislation at the EU level 
and within its member states. It further argues that mainly the preventive 
component of the AML/CTF legislation will be strengthened by the EU instru­
ments adopted in mid-2015. However, this Article concludes that the adoption of 
global soft standards has posed signiﬁcant challenges to the EU legislative 
framework. The arguments are developed in four parts. The Article ﬁrst 
highlights the main regulatory prescriptions that stem from the study of the 
phenomenology and the economics of AML/CTF regulation and underpin the 
current international regulatory paradigm. Second, it explores the evolution of 
the main international instruments in the ﬁeld with a special focus on the role 
played by the FATF Recommendations. It also illustrates the relation between 
these instruments and the adoption of the new EU AML/CTF legislation from 
two different, but complementary, angles: (1) noting that the current interna­
tional AML/CTF framework has a multidisciplinary approach, the Article 
focuses on the framework’s repressive component and assessing the limits of the 
EU criminal approach against money laundering and terrorist ﬁnancing; and 
(2) examining the recent EU preventive legislation and addressing the main 
challenges posed to the EU legislative framework when attempting to accommo­
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date global standards, especially regarding tensions with fundamental freedoms 
and human rights protected within the EU. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has been key to developing 
a body of soft rules on anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorist 
ﬁnancing (AML/CTF). Soft law instruments have generally been con­
sidered more suitable for regulating such matters because nations are 
generally wary of undertaking excessively stringent commitments.1 
Diritto e non diritto nella CSCE, in LA NUOVA EUROPA DELLA CSCE 47, 62 
(Giovanni Barberini & Natalino Ronzitti eds., 1994). 
Moreover, soft law instruments are characterized by a sufﬁcient degree 
of ﬂexibility that allows prompt adaptation to changing regulatory 
needs.2 This kind of ﬂexibility and openness to change is particularly 
important in a ﬁeld where domestic laws and regulations, as well as 
enforcement actions, have to keep pace with money launderers and 
terrorist ﬁnanciers to remain effective.3 The soft nature4 
EUROMEDITERR´ ANEOS BANCAJA DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 139 (2006); Martti Koskenniemi, The 
Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics, 70 MOD. L. REV. 1, 4-15 (2007); Anne 
Peters, Soft Law as a New Mode of Governance, in THE DYNAMIC OF CHANGE IN EU GOVERNANCE 31-32 
(Udo Diedrichs, Wulf Reiners & Wolfgang Wessesls eds., 2011). With reference to the FATF, see 
Stavros Gadinis, Three Pathways to Global Standards: Private, Regulation, and Ministry Networks, 109 
AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2015). 
of the FATF 
Recommendations allows constant updating thereof, as well as the 
participation of non-state actors, such as banks and other ﬁnancial 
institutions.5 
1. Luigi Condorelli, 
2. The phrase “soft law” generally comprises “all those social rules generated by State[s] or 
other subjects of international law which are not legally binding but which are nevertheless of 
special legal relevance.” Daniel Thu¨rer, Soft Law, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 271 (Ru¨diger Wolfrum ed., 2013). Legal scholarship has extensively investi­
gated the relevance of soft law instruments in the context of international relations. See Jaye Ellis, 
Shades of Grey: Soft Law and the Validity of Public International Law, 25 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 313 (2012); 
Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 143 (1983); 
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 
421 (2000). 
3. It has been noted that “the form of Recommendations appropriately reﬂects the evolving 
character of the conduct that they address.” CECILY ROSE, INTERNATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION NORMS: 
THEIR CREATION AND INFLUENCE ON DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEMS 192 (2015). 
4. See Tullio Treves, International Law: Achievements and Challenges, in X CURSOS 
5. See ROSE, supra note 3, at 195. 
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Moreover, the emergence of a body of AML soft rules is an illustra­
tion of the growing tendency towards specialization and fragmentation 
of international law,6 as well as an illustration of the role that soft law 
may play in developing international technical regulation. The high 
level of detail, based on economic models, which inspires and shapes 
the current AML/CTF legal framework ﬁnds its ﬁrst and natural “body” 
in a soft law instrument (such as the FATF Recommendations) adopted 
by a technocratic body (like the FATF) and thereafter—and only 
thereafter— could be translated into binding international legal 
instruments. 
The interconnectedness of ﬁnancial markets has favored the wide­
spread diffusion of such standards. States have generally attempted to 
comply with them in order to gain legitimacy and maintain access to 
ﬁnancial markets.7 However, the FATF has generally acted as a “single­
minded” body with a single and overriding objective.8 This “mono­
dimensional” approach, however, has often failed to pay sufﬁcient 
heed to a number of legitimate concerns, not least the protection of 
fundamental rights, such as the right to privacy and the right to protect 
personal data.9 Consequently, domestic measures implementing FATF 
standards may often impinge on such rights. The EU legal system 
constitutes an ideal vantage point to look into this tussle. For one thing, 
the EU and its member states have actively participated in the develop­
ment of international and regional instruments from the inception of 
the efforts to combat money laundering and terrorist ﬁnancing.10 
Secondary EU legislation has generally incorporated in full the content 
of FATF Recommendations. Since the adoption in 1991 of the First 
6. Legal scholarship has investigated at length this tendency. See, e.g., Andreas Fischer-
Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of 
Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 999 (2004); Koskenniemi, supra note 4, at 5-9. 
7. See generally J. C. SHARMAN, THE MONEY LAUNDRY: REGULATING CRIMINAL FINANCE IN THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY (2011). 
8. Valsamis Mitsilegas & Niovi Vavoula, The Evolving EU Anti-Money Laundering Regime-
Challenges for Fundamental Rights and The Rule of Law, 23 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 261, 
292-293 (2016). 
9. Leonardo Borlini, Regulating Criminal Finance in the EU in the Light of the International 
Instruments, Y.B. EUR. L. 1, 41 (2017). 
10. See, e.g., FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, INT’L STANDARDS ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND 
THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND PROLIFERATION (2016) (ebook) [hereinafter FATF Recommenda­
tions]; see also Eleni Tsingou, Money Laundering, in EUROPE AND THE GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL 
FINANCE 151 (Daniel Mu¨gge ed., 2014). 
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European Commission (EC) Anti-Money-Laundering Directive,11 EU 
money laundering (ML) and, later, terrorist ﬁnancing (TF) countermea­
sures have closely reﬂected international developments. Having said 
that, when exercising its legislative power, the EU is required to comply 
with the fundamental rights protected under EU law. Since its seminal 
judgment in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft12 
Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fu¨r  
Getrreide, 1970 E.C.R. 1125. 
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in 1970, the European 
Court of Justice has considered fundamental rights as general prin­
ciples of the EU legal system. Subsequently, after the entry into force of 
the Treaty of Lisbon, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union has eventually acquired EU primary law status. 
Whether, however, the EU legislation in this ﬁeld is always consistent 
with such rights is not entirely sure. 
This Article investigates the evolution of AML/CTF soft law and its 
implementation in the EU legal system. Bearing this in mind, it then 
considers how EU AML/CTF legislation interacts with the protection 
of fundamental rights and, especially, the rights to privacy and the 
rights to data protection. In Section II, it discusses the main regulatory 
prescriptions that stem from the study of the phenomenology and 
economics of regulation of money laundering and terrorism ﬁnancing 
underpinning the current international anti-money-laundering and 
counter-terrorist ﬁnancing law. In Section III, it outlines the central 
role played by the FATF Recommendations in the evolution of interna­
tional initiatives in the ﬁeld. Notably, it illustrates that the EU AML/ 
CTF legislation is modelled on the Recommendations and features an 
articulated multidisciplinary approach. In Section IV, it deals with the 
repressive component of such a legislative framework and assesses the 
limits of the EU criminal approach against laundering and terrorism 
ﬁnancing crimes. Section V focuses on the challenges posed to the EU 
legislative framework when accommodating global standards, espe­
cially with regard to possible tensions with fundamental freedoms and 
human rights. In particular, it explores the complex interplay between, 
on the one hand, AML/CTF measures and, on the other hand, the 
right to fair trial, the protection of personal data, and the right to 
privacy. 
11. Council Directive 91/308/EEC, of 10 June 1991, Prevention and Use of the Financial 
System for the Purpose of Money Laundering, 1991 O.J. (L 166) 77 [hereinafter First AML 
Directive]. 
12. Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. 
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II. PHENOMENOLOGY OF CRIMINAL FINANCE: REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS 
This Section delves into the regulatory response to criminal ﬁnance. 
Section A explains how the integration of ﬁnancial markets opened the 
way to the proliferation of criminal ﬁnance. Sections B and C outline 
the characteristics of the existing international legal framework appli­
cable to criminal ﬁnance and the interaction among rules on AML and 
CTF strategies. Finally, Sections D and E analyze the economic ratio­
nales justifying the regulatory intervention and international coopera­
tion in this ﬁeld. 
A. Globalization and the Burgeoning of Criminal Finance 
The increasing deregulation and integration of ﬁnancial markets, 
along with unprecedented technologic progress, have contributed to 
the burgeoning of criminal ﬁnance over the past thirty years.13 Due to 
the combination of these factors, the number of cross-border ﬁnancial 
transactions has increased at a striking pace. Nowadays, businesses’ 
faceless employees can transfer huge amounts of money from one 
corner of the world to another with a mere click of the mouse.14 Also, a 
variety of ﬁnancial instruments—over-the-counter derivatives, interna­
tional mortgages, and bank-to-bank loans—may facilitate the perpetra­
tion of illegal conduct. Against this background, domestic regulatory 
and enforcement authorities often fall short of tackling a crime, which 
often has a cross-border dimension. Not surprisingly, businesses and 
habitual money launderers have little difﬁculty in taking advantage of 
loopholes among national jurisdictions. It is thus evident that interna­
tional cooperation and, notably, the adoption of international instru­
ments play a crucial role in ﬁghting all such crimes.15 
13. See Mark Pieth, International Standards against Money Laundering, in A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 
TO ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF SYSTEMS IN SINGAPORE, SWITZERLAND, THE UK 
AND THE USA 5 (Mark Pieth & Gemma Aiolﬁ eds., 2004). 
14. See Cyrille Fijnaut, Transnational Crime and the Role of the United Nations in Its Containment 
through International Cooperation: A Challenge for the 21st Century, 8 EUR. J. CRIME CRIM. L. & CRIM. 
JUST. 119 (2000). 
15. See, e.g., VALSAMIS MITSILEGAS, MONEY LAUNDERING COUNTER-MEASURES IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION: A NEW PARADIGM OF SECURITY GOVERNANCE VERSUS FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES 18 
(2003); WILLIAM C. GILMORE, DIRTY MONEY: THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL MEASURES TO 
COUNTER MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM 13 (2004). 
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B. The Emergence of a Comprehensive Approach to Fight Money Laundering 
The need to devise a global strategy to target the proceeds of 
proﬁt-generating criminal offenses translated into a combination of 
global “hard law” treaty instruments and “soft law” standards, elabo­
rated within the conﬁnes of the FATF. Hard law treaties were mainly 
negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations. Notably, the U.N. 
Convention against Illicit Trafﬁc in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances of 1988, the U.N. Convention against Transnational Orga­
nized Crime (UNCTOC) and its protocols, and the U.N. Convention 
against Corruption (UNCAC) all contain analytical provisions to pre­
vent and repress money laundering, as well as terrorist ﬁnancing.16 In 
addition, a number of regional treaties target the crimes at issue (e.g., 
the 2005 Council of Europe Convention against money laundering and 
terrorist ﬁnancing).17 After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.N. Security 
Council designed its response to Islamic terrorism by adopting a 
broader conception of the principle “follow the money”.18 
16. See, e.g., United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime art. 6, Nov. 
15, 2000, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209; United Nations Convention against Corruption art. 14, Oct. 31, 2003, 
2349 U.N.T.S. 41. 
17. See supra Section II.A. 
18. As is widely known, after 9/11, the U.N. went beyond its conventional approach to 
terrorism and adopted Security Council Resolutions that add complexity to the existing legal 
framework. Therefore, after the adoption of the 1999 International Convention for the Suppres­
sion of Financing of Terrorism, the Security Council became the focal point of discussions and the 
forum for the adoption of measures against terrorism. Signiﬁcantly, in subsequent resolutions, it 
stressed the importance of terrorist ﬁnancing, obliging states to implement speciﬁc measures in 
identifying and freezing terrorist-related funds. These novel measures underscored the inad­
equacy of domestic and international ﬁnancial systems in dealing with terrorist funds, although 
the problem was not unknown. Furthermore, they exposed a lack of intra-state coordination and 
coordination among states, intergovernmental organizations, and private ﬁnancial institutions. 
Security Council Resolution 1373/2001 stated that all “States should prevent and suppress the 
ﬁnancing of terrorism, as well as criminalize the wilful provision or collection of funds for such 
acts. The funds, ﬁnancial assets and economic resources of those who commit or attempt to 
commit terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts and of persons 
and entities acting on behalf of terrorists should also be frozen without delay.” The Security 
Council also decided that “States should prohibit their nationals or persons or entities in their 
territories from making funds, ﬁnancial assets, economic resources, ﬁnancial or other related 
services available to persons who commit or attempt to commit, facilitate or participate in the 
commission of terrorist acts.” In short, the obligations of the 1999 Convention were substantially 
reproduced in Resolution 1373 of 2001 so that the U.N. member states were expected to comply 
with the obligations of the Convention, without taking into account whether they had ratiﬁed it or 
not. See S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 6 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
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On the other hand, soft law greatly inﬂuenced the international legal 
framework against criminal ﬁnance. The FATF Recommendations 
constitute the universal standards for AML/CTF domestic legislation in 
the world. Although the Recommendations are a non-binding instru­
ment, they have taken a quasi-binding character because of the large 
membership of the FATF—which includes virtually all developed and 
several emerging countries—and the sanctions mechanism ensuring 
their implementation.19 Moreover, the reproduction of several of its 
provisions in a wide variety of international “hard” instruments, as well 
as the explicit reference to these provisions made by some U.N. 
Security Council Resolutions against terrorism, also have contributed 
to increase the importance of such non-binding standards.20 In a 2005, 
for example, the Security Council strongly urged all member states to 
implement the comprehensive, international standards embodied in 
the FATF Recommendations to tackle laundering crimes and terrorist 
ﬁnancing.21 As is well known, AML countermeasures are absolutely key 
to ﬁghting criminal organizations. A sound anti-organized-crime strat­
egy should necessarily aim to tackle the complex corporate structures 
created by such criminal organizations.22 
Although these organizations are more effective in their home 
countries,23 their ability and inclination to operate across national 
boundaries in order to maximize their proﬁts is evident. The fact that 
ﬁnancial capital “can move freely between countries has created new 
19. Borlini, supra note 9, at 14-15. 
20. Id. 
21. S.C. Res. 2255 (Dec. 21, 2015). The Security Council repeated this exhortation in 
December 2015. S.C. Res. 2253 (Dec. 17, 2015). 
22. See William C. Gilmore, Money Laundering, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF TRANSNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 331-332 (Neil Boister & Robert J. Currie eds., 2015); see also SABRINA ADAMOLI ET AL., 
ORGANISED CRIME AROUND THE WORLD 25 (1998). 
23. See EUROPOL, THREAT ASSESSMENT: ITALIAN ORGANIZED CRIME 15 (2013) (remarking that 
inﬁltration in the legal economy through complex money-laundering techniques is one of the 
emerging and most dangerous trends of the Italian criminal organizations’ lives: “[t]o quote a 
well-known Italian Public Prosecutor, ‘Italian OCGs today are the only EU economic competitors 
that suffer the opposite problem of all other entrepreneurs: too much cash money and not 
enough possibilities of reinvestment.’ This concept, combined with the on-going economic crisis, 
explains the recent trend towards inﬁltration in the legal economy: through sophisticated money 
laundering schemes and through careful investments in particular sectors, these groups not only 
attempt to justify their immense wealth, but present themselves on the market as strong 
competitors who can afford to operate ‘at a loss’, creating in the long run a situation of 
quasi-monopoly that undermines the basic principles of free market”). 
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ways for organized crime to disguise the origin of illegal proceeds”.24 
Al Capone to Al Qaeda, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON MONEY LAUNDERING 21 (Brigitte Unger & Daan van der Linde eds., 2013). 
Developing a sophisticated treasury-type activity from simple trade 
ﬁnance was a signiﬁcant step for criminal organizations and full-scale 
international money laundering an easy step thereafter.25 
Through money laundering, criminals may pollute the whole economic environment 
and, eventually, integrate themselves and their businesses within local societies: the case of the 
boss of the drug cartel of Medellin, Pablo Escobar Gaviria, who, at the apex of his power during 
the 1980s, volunteered to adjust the Colombian public debt, is just the most notorious example of 
such contamination. See PIETRO GRASSO & ENRICO BELLAVIA, SOLDI SPORCHI: COME LE MAFIE 
RICICLANO MILIARDI E INQUINANO L’ECONOMIA 11 (2011); see also EUROPOL, supra note 23, at 15. 
Removing the ﬁnancial incentive to committing crime and reducing 
ﬁnancial ability to perpetrate crimes—by tracing, freezing, and conﬁs­
cating the proceeds of such crime—plays a major role in crime preven­
tion. AML regulation has, therefore, become a cornerstone of a broader 
agenda to ﬁght organized crime and other crimes, including corrup­
tion, by depriving criminals— both corrupt public ofﬁcials and 
corruptors— of ill-gotten gains and by prosecuting those who assist 
in laundering these gains.26 
C. The Interplay between AML and CTF Strategies 
Money laundering and terrorist ﬁnancing are characterized by rather 
opposing dynamics and objectives. The former aims to rub out the 
illicit origin of a given amount of money. Therefore, the rationale of 
AML legislation is to prevent criminals from enjoying the proﬁts of 
their previous crimes (predicate crimes). Terrorist ﬁnancing, instead, 
implies “money dirtying,” which is the reverse of money laundering.27 
That is to say, it diverts “clean money” into terrorist activities.28 Accord­
ingly, the main concern of money launderers is to conceal the origin of 
the money, while terrorists generally seek to hide the funded activity.29 
Notwithstanding their differences, international and domestic law 
instruments jointly deal with these crimes. This policy choice is often 
warranted by efﬁciency considerations. For one thing, the ﬁght against 
these crimes entails a “horizontal strategy” embracing a wide variety of 
24. Brigitte Unger, Money Laundering Regulation: From 
25. 
26. See Louis de Koker & Mark Turkington, Transnational Organised Crime and the Anti-Money 
Laundering Regime, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME 241 (Pierre Hauck 
& Sven Peterke eds., 2016). 
27. Unger, supra note 24, at 21. 
28. For example, in the guise of legal charity, donations may be moved to sponsor terrorist 
organizations. 
29. Borlini, supra note 9, at 4. 
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ﬁelds, including criminal law, administrative law, and public interna­
tional law.30 Moreover, both crimes presuppose the deployment of 
ﬁnancial institutions for illicit purposes and often adopt similar tech­
niques.31 More importantly, money laundering may be instrumental in 
concealing the illegal origin and destination of funds directed to 
ﬁnance terrorist activities.32 Ultimately, combining AML and CTF 
strategies enables enforcement authorities to tackle both crimes in a 
more effective manner.33 
D. Economic Rationales of AML/CTF Disciplines 
Economists have conceived reﬁned models to interpret and design 
AML/CTF regulation, distinguishing regulation in this ﬁeld from 
regulation of other related issues like the economic and ﬁnancial 
implications of money laundering, the scale of the crime, and the 
taxonomy of the techniques of laundering.34 The economics of AML/ 
CTF regulation aims at, simultaneously, justifying tax money spent on 
AML policies and orienting lawmakers so that they can shape accurate 
responses to money laundering and terrorist ﬁnancing, pursuing both 
effectiveness and efﬁciency of AML regulation and enforcement.35 
30. See John Vervaele, Economic Crimes and Money Laundering: A New Paradigm for the Criminal 
Justice System?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MONEY LAUNDERING, supra note 24, at 385-86. 
31. See id.; PAUL ALLAN SHCOTT, REFERENCE GUIDE TO ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING 
THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM I-5-I-10 (2d ed. Supp. 2006). 
32. Unger, supra note 24, at 20. The Taliban, for example, proﬁted from the trafﬁcking of 
opium and taxing the drug trade in areas under its control, and these funds were subsequently 
used to support terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda. See S.C. Res. 1333 (Dec. 19, 2000). 
According to the U.N. Ofﬁce on Drugs and Crime, estimates of the income derived by the Taliban 
from taxes levied on opium production range from $15 to $27 million per annum. See Rep. of the 
Committee of Experts Appointed Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1333 (2000), Para­
graph 15(a), Regarding Monitoring of the Arms Embargo against the Taliban and the Closure of 
Terrorist Training Camps in the Taliban-held Areas of Afghanistan (2001), ¶ 60, U.N. Doc. 
S/2001/511 (May 21, 2001). By the same token, the recent Resolution 2199/2015, adopted by the 
UN Security Council on 12 February 2015, also underscores the possibility that terrorism is 
ﬁnanced by the proceeds of organized crime and drug trafﬁcking. See S.C. Res. 2199 (Feb. 12, 
2015). 
33. See infra Section IV. 
34. The literature on the economics of money laundering and on the indications that may be 
derived for an accurate AML policy has lately ﬂourished. For a comprehensive study, see DONATO 
MASCIANDARO, EL O ATS &BRIGITTE UNGER, BLACK FINANCE: THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY LAUNDER­D TAK´ 
ING (2007). See also RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MONEY LAUNDERING, supra note 24 (referring to a wide 
literature). 
35. Unger, supra note 24, 25-29. 
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Analytical microeconomic models for more effective AML/CTF 
countermeasures have focused both on the demand and the supply 
side. For example, Donato Masciandaro’s study ﬁrst considers the 
demand side.36 The model assumes that a rational agent—a criminal 
actor or organization—deriving revenues from a criminal activity aims 
at maximizing the expected utility of the resulting criminal proceeds.37 
The criminal/organization may or may not choose laundering. Game 
theory may help to identify the main determinants of money launder­
ing and establish their relationship with the expected utility. The 
utility, in fact, increases with the average return expected from 
reinvestment—licit (investment) and/or illicit (re-accumulation)—of 
the laundered cash and decreases in relation to cost of laundering 
(typical transactional costs), probability of detection, and severity of 
punishment (also assumed as transactional costs).38 
An economic analysis of the supply side is also relevant for designing 
effective countermeasures. The banking and ﬁnancial sectors can play 
a crucial role in the development of criminal activities as vehicles for 
cleaning dirty money. The supply side of the money laundering market 
consists of regulatory agencies that are supposed to ﬁght money 
laundering (the Authority) and ﬁnancial intermediaries (the Bank or 
other ﬁnancial institutions), which may or may not be honest and 
compliant with law and regulations. The typical market issues are 
asymmetric information and principal-agent problems.39 
See Lucia D. Pellegrina & Donato Masciandaro, The Risk Based Approach in the New European 
Anti-Money Laundering Legislation: A Law and Economics View, 5 REV. LAW & ECON. 932 (2009); MARK 
PIETH &GEMMA AIOLFI, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING: LEVELLING THE PLAYING FIELD (2003), https://www. 
baselgovernance.org/sites/collective.localhost/ﬁles/publications/biog_working_paper_01.pdf. 
In other words, 
on the one hand, the Authority does not always possess full information 
about the ﬁnancial intermediaries; on the other hand, ﬁnancial inter­
mediaries do not internalize the beneﬁts of the enforcement of anti­
money-laundering laws. 
In deﬁning an effective system of AML/CTF law, four elements 
should be carefully considered40: (a) the difference in information 
assets between individual intermediaries and regulatory agencies, the 
market at hand being opaque by deﬁnition; (b) the non-veriﬁability of 
intermediaries’ efforts to comply; (c) the cost of the latter for interme­
36. See Donato Masciandaro, Money Laundering: The Economics of Regulation, 7 EUR. J. L. & 
ECON. 225 (1999). 
37. Id. at 227-28. 
38. Id. at 225-30. 
39. 
40. See Pellegrina & Masciandaro, supra note 39, at 933-35. 
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diaries; and (d) the non-veriﬁability of the inﬂuence of the effort on 
the performance of the regulation. The more specialized and ﬁnan­
cially educated the AML agency, the more efﬁcient its actions.41 The 
above-mentioned model also underlines that efﬁcient regulation of the 
supply side requires that regulators take the problem of compliance 
costs into due consideration. This model has two key bearings on 
AML/CTF regulation. 
First, AML/CTF regulation should directly involve ﬁnancial interme­
diaries and other professional categories in order to cope with the issue 
of asymmetric information and enhance the prevention of laundering 
crimes. These subjects, who have a tangible and direct contact with 
their clients, are better placed to detect potential suspicious activities.42 
The private sector should perform a number of preventive measures 
(customer identiﬁcation, customer due diligence notiﬁcation of suspi­
cious operations to the competent public authorities), together with 
compulsory network duties. 
Second, the regulatory framework should be risk-based (the so-called 
risk-based approach [RBA]) in order to reduce compliance costs for 
the private sector. The goal of a risk-oriented AML regulation is to 
calibrate measures to risk, meaning that the highest money laundering 
or terrorist ﬁnancing risks should receive maximum attention in terms 
of resource allocation in order to increase the regulatory outcome.43 
See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, FATF GUIDANCE ON THE RISK-BASED APPROACH TO COMBATING 
MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING: HIGH LEVEL PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES 2 (2007), 
http://www.fatf-gaﬁ.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/High%20Level%20Principles%20and% 
20Procedures.pdf. 
This idea has another major implication for AML/CTF regulation: it 
shifts part of the responsibility for deﬁning the risks and developing 
countermeasures, and above all, for dynamic risk-management, onto 
the private institutions and professionals involved. Taken together, 
these elements produce a regulatory model based on a public-private 
partnership. 
E. Economic Arguments Supporting International Cooperation 
Recent studies show how models of international economics and tax 
competition can be applied to money laundering issues. These works 
essentially represent variations of Tinbergen’s model, which imports 
Newton’s theory of gravity to economics to foresee trade ﬂows among 
41. See id. 
42. See ANTOINETTE VERHAGE, THE ANTI MONEY LAUNDERING COMPLEX AND THE COMPLIANCE 
INDUSTRY (2011). 
43. 
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countries.44 Applied to the money laundering context, this model gives 
a credible explanation of launderers’ behavior. Newton’s masses are 
replaced by the per capita GDP and the amount of crime and criminal 
proceeds, attractiveness indicators replace gravity, and the physical 
distance is augmented by cultural and economic distance. Thus, assum­
ing that launderers behave as rational actors, they tend to invest their 
money in developed countries with low corruption and conﬂicts. In 
addition, launderers prefer easy and quick access as provided by 
countries that are members of the Society for Worldwide Interbank 
Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT). Obviously, they prefer to in­
vest where it is possible to get high rates of return. But, contrary to the 
typical licit investor, they prefer countries with high bank secrecy and 
lax AML law.45 These patterns seem to be conﬁrmed by the allocation 
of money laundering around the world: Unger’s empirical research 
leads to the somewhat counterintuitive result that, globally, most of the 
top-twenty countries receiving money for laundering are well estab­
lished, well developed, and quite sizeable—the major one being the 
United States.46 Money laundering is thus not restricted to small 
countries and tax havens; rather, it represents a serious problem for 
well-established industrialized countries endowed with functional ﬁnan­
cial markets like those in the EU. 
Unger also questions whether it pays for countries to compete for 
criminal money, assuming that the underlying crime (e.g., drug trafﬁck­
ing) stays in the original country (e.g., Colombia) and only the pro­
ceeds of the predicate crime (e.g., the drug money) moves to well-
developed economies (e.g., Europe and the United States).47 Tax 
competition models show that original welfare gains deriving from the 
additional criminal money can easily be lost when other countries 
adopt the same policy.48 This model assumes that countries can deliber­
ately choose to “launder or not,” an effective AML policy being 
adoptable at will.49 
According to this model, successful ﬁnancial markets can attract all 
kinds of investors, even criminals. Based on this assumption, money 
laundering can be interpreted as a typical externality also in interna­
44. See JAN TINBERGEN, SHAPING THE WORLD ECONOMY: SUGGESTIONS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC POLICY (1962). 
45. See MASCIANDARO, TAK´ ATS & UNGER, supra note 34, at xii. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
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tional economics, with the effect that governments that do not internal­
ize the harms of crime committed elsewhere might want to turn a blind 
eye to laundering operations of foreign money. Seen from this perspec­
tive, the case for international coordination of AML laws is compelling. 
States can avoid the non-cooperative equilibrium of the implied prison­
er’s dilemma only by reciprocally tying their hands. 
F. Drawing Some Lessons for a Comprehensive AML/CTF Regulation 
The study of the phenomenology of money laundering and 
terrorist ﬁnancing and the economics of their regulation bears 
important regulatory implications. First, the opportunities offered 
to criminals, launderers, and terrorists by globalization, the fre­
quent transnational dimension of laundering crimes, along with the 
risks of non-cooperative equilibrium highlighted by international eco­
nomic models, suggest that an effective AML/CTF normative response 
is to be developed through the highest possible level of international 
coordination among states.50 
Second, AML and CTF strategies converge: they aim at attacking the 
criminal or terrorist organization through its ﬁnancial activities and 
use the ﬁnancial trails to identify the various components of the 
criminal or terrorist network. In both cases, investigations mainly target 
ﬁnancial institutions through which criminal and terroristic groups 
move and deploy their resources.51 
Third, the issue of asymmetric information and the principal-agent 
problems between individual intermediaries and regulatory agencies 
pose major regulatory challenges and explain why a wide array of 
ﬁnancial institutions and other private actors should be compelled to 
play an active role—particularly through their dynamic and continuous 
relationships with public supervisors. In other words, an effective 
AML/CTF strategy should be based on a well-designed public-private 
sector partnership.52 Further, within such partnerships, the cost of 
AML/CTF compliance for private intermediaries and other designated 
subjects could be very high. One option to address these challenges is 
to calibrate the regulatory framework to risks. 
50. See, e.g., Borlini, supra note 9, at 3. 
51. Id. at 6. 
52. Id. at 30. 
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III. THE INTERNATIONAL AML/CTF REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
A. The Evolution of AML/CTF Law 
AML/CTF rules have undergone a gradual evolution. At the outset, 
they were mainly domestic rules, which imposed on banks the obliga­
tion to keep records and report transactions with a view to helping the 
enforcement authorities in the discharge of their duties. Things, 
however, started to change at the end of the eighties53 and, in particu­
lar, after the creation of the FATF in 1989. Initially, this body was 
designed to favor cooperation at the international level in the ﬁeld of 
money laundering, particularly with respect to the seizure of money 
laundering’s proceeds. Subsequently, the resurgence of international 
extremist Islamic terrorism brought about a proliferation of interna­
tional instruments in this ﬁeld, as well as the enlargement of the remit 
of the FATF.54 The rise of international cooperation and the mushroom­
ing of soft- and hard-law international instruments55 in this ﬁeld have 
been conducive to the diffusion of money laundering and terrorist 
ﬁnancing criminal legislation. What is more, increased collaboration 
also resulted in the introduction of a wide array of rules aimed at 
involving the private sector in the prevention of these crimes. The 
following section will brieﬂy look into the components of this framework. 
B. The FATF: A “Soft” International Organization 
In 1989, sixteen members—ﬁfteen OECD countries and the Euro­
pean Commission members—established the FATF with a view to 
setting common international standards for AML and CTF regula­
53. See Ethan A. Nadelmann, Unlaundering Dirty Money Abroad: U.S. Foreign Policy and Financial 
Secrecy Jurisdictions, 18 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 33, 34-35 (1986). 
54. GILMORE, supra note 15, at 123-24. 
55. The main international treaties in the ﬁeld are: United Nations Convention against Illicit 
Trafﬁc in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 95 (entered 
into force Nov. 11, 1990); International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, 39 I.L.M. 27 (entered into force Apr. 19, 2002); Council of Europe 
Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Conﬁscation of the Proceeds from Crime, Nov. 
8, 1990, E.T.S. No. 141 (entered into force Sept. 1, 1993); United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15, 2000, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209 (with three Protocols thereto); 
United Nations Convention Against Corruption art. 14, Dec. 14, 2005, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41; Council 
of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Conﬁscation of the Proceeds from 
Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism, May 16, 2005, C.E.T.S. No. 198 (entered into force May 
1, 2008); Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, May 16, 2005, C.E.T.S. 
No. 196 (entered into force June 1, 2007). 
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tion.56 
GILMORE, supra note 15, at 91; DENNIS COX, HANDBOOK OF ANTI MONEY LAUNDERING 21 
(2014); SIMONE FAIELLA, RICICLAGGIO E CRIMINE ORGANIZZATO TRANSNAZIONALE 39 (2009). 
Currently with thirty-seven members and two observers, the 
FATF is the most important trans-governmental network in the ﬁeld of 
AML.57 Trans-governmental-networks governance has a number of 
advantages. Given their trans-national nature, these networks are well 
suited to address cross-border issues.58 In addition, they generally 
ensure a high level of specialization of their members, not least because 
of the constant information sharing among them.59 Last, unlike “tradi­
tional” and more institutionalized multilateral international organiza­
tions, such as the U.N. and the World Trade Organization, they are 
generally more ﬂexible and efﬁcient.60 
However, these very features also may be regarded as weaknesses in 
some instances. First, ﬂexibility and informal decision-making may 
raise concerns about the transparency of the procedures leading to the 
adoption of the AML standards and third-party participation.61 Sec­
ond, these networks are likely to replicate, or even magnify, the 
unequal distribution of power between nations.62 Third, the high 
degree of specialization of these networks may result in the adoption of 
standards that overlook a wide array of non-sectorial interests.63 Taken 
together, these factors undermine the legitimacy and the accountabil­
ity of such networks.64 Furthermore, the peculiar characteristics of the 
FATF make it more difﬁcult to determine whether it can qualify as an 
56. 
57. Eleanor D. Kinney, The Emerging Field of International Administrative Law: Its Content and 
Potential, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 415, 425 (2002); cf. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy 
through Government Networks, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNA­
TIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Michael Byers ed., 2000). As mentioned above, the 
FATF currently comprises thirty-ﬁve member jurisdictions (including ﬁfteen EU member states) 
and two international organizations (the EU is represented by the Commission). It represents 
major ﬁnancial centres in all parts of the globe and can be rightly considered as the main global 
body that sets standards and supervises the ﬁght against money laundering and terrorist ﬁnancing. 
Alain Damais, The Financial Action Task Force, in ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
PRACTICE 69, 73 (Wouter H. Muller et al. eds., 2007); see GILMORE, supra note 15, at 89. 
58. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 8 (2004). 
59. Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and 
the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 24 (2002). 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 25. 
62. Id.; see also Stephen J. Toope, Emerging Patterns of Governance and International Law, in THE 
ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, supra note 57, at 96-97. 
63. Mitsilegas & Vavoula, supra note 8, at 292-93. 
64. See Antonio F. Perez, Who Killed Sovereignty? or: Changing Norms Concerning Sovereignty in 
International Law, 14 WIS. INT’L L. J. 463, 476 (1996); Sol Picciotto, Networks in International 
Economic Integration: Fragmented States and the Dilemmas of Neo-Liberalism, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 
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international organization. Determining the nature of the FATF is not 
a mere theoretical exercise. In fact, should it qualify as a full-ﬂedged 
international organization, it would probably be, at least to some 
extent, subject to the rules of international law applicable to interna­
tional organizations. In this respect, it should be observed that the 
FATF, like many other international ﬁnancial institutions, has been 
traditionally deemed a “soft institution.”65 
See generally INT’L LAW ASS’N, THE HAGUE CONFERENCE (2010): INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 
OF CONSUMERS, www.rulac.org/assets/downloads/ILA_report_armed_conﬂict_2010.pdf (last vis­
ited Oct. 10, 2017). 
This extremely ﬁtting descrip­
tion, however, raises the question of whether the attribute of “softness” 
is inconsistent with the status of “international organization.”66 Accord­
ing to the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organi­
zations of 2011, an international organization is “established by a treaty 
or other instrument governed by international law and possessing its 
own international legal personality. International organizations may 
include as members, in addition to states, other entities.”67 
Although this deﬁnition seems to be modelled on a “traditional” 
conception of international organization, it does not rule out the 
possibility of qualifying the FATF as an international organization. In 
particular, it seems that the reference to “other instrument governed 
by international law” leaves the door open for a variety of institutions 
that do not originate from the conclusion of an international agree­
ment. In this respect, an authoritative commentator has observed that 
an international agreement is not a necessary condition for the exis­
tence of an international organization.68 
DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE E PERSONALITA` GIURIDICA 201 (1972); 
Condorelli, supra note 1, at 47-62; CARLO FOCARELLI, TRATTATO DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 138-139 
(2015). 
Nor can the status of interna­
tional organization be denied because of the composition of an organi­
zation’s membership. Put brieﬂy, it is not possible to exclude the FATF 
as an international organization for the sole fact that non-state institu­
tions, such as the European Commission and the Gulf Co-operation 
1014, 1047 (1997); Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Accountability of Government Networks, 8 IND. J.  
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 347, 361-66 (2001). 
65. 
66. See Jan Klabbers, Institutional Ambivalence by Design: Soft Organizations in International Law, 
70 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 403, 421 (2001). 
67. Int’l L. Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations, art. 
2(a), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.778 (May 30, 2011). The ILC’s conclusions on the point are fully 
consistent with the Special Rapporteur’s analysis. See, e.g., Int’l Law Comm’n, Eighth Rep. on 
Responsibility of International Organizations, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/640 (Mar. 14, 2011). 
68. GAETANO ARANGIO-RUIZ,
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Council, are included among its members.69 What is more, the FATF 
bears many of the “typical” characteristics of international organiza­
tions. First, it has its own resources and a permanent structure in order 
to ensure an effective and continuous activity.70 Second, it monitors the 
implementation of its Recommendations in members’ domestic legal 
systems.71 
e Regolamentazione “Tecnica” di Problemi di Sicurezza 
Pubblica e Integrita` Finanziaria, 100 RIV. DIR. INT. 356, 381-85 (2017). 
Third, its ofﬁcials enjoy the same immunities and privileges 
of OECD’s ofﬁcials.72 In light of the above, it is possible to argue that at 
least some of the rules of international law applicable to international 
organizations (e.g., rules on immunity) could be applied to FATF. 
C. The “Hard” Impact of Global “Soft” Instruments 
The FATF Recommendations, ﬁrst issued in February 1990, then 
revised in 1996, 2003, and 2012,73 represent the universal standards 
shaping AML/CTF legislation around the globe, including the EU. 
The Recommendations take the form of a non-binding instrument. 
However, as the FATF has come to serve as the international standard-
setter in the AML/CTF ﬁeld, its non-binding Recommendations have 
taken on a nearly binding character74 due to the large membership of 
the FATF and the sanctions mechanism that accompanies the Recom­
mendations.75 Moreover, these quasi-binding standards often have 
been turned into binding provisions of international “hard” instru­
ments and of the aforementioned U.N. Security Council Resolutions.76 
Hence, in the AML/CTF ﬁeld, there is a deep and dynamic interaction 
between soft and hard law, both depending on and strengthening the 
other in a recurring relationship. 
The Recommendations consist of forty consolidated recommenda­
tions urging FATF Members to introduce substantive and procedural 
69. ARANGIO-RUIZ, supra note 68; Condorelli, supra note 1, at 47-62; FOCARELLI, supra note 68. 
70. Damais, supra note 57, at 72. 
71. Monitoring is carried out through annual self-assessments and periodic mutual evalua­
tions to do so. Despite FATF’s limited membership, its mutual assessment methodology has also 
been applied in other jurisdictions. FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs) have been established in 
eight regions to promote the FATF standards outside of the thirty-six FATF members. These eight 
FSRBs work together with the actual FATF members to create a network of nearly 200 countries. 
Leonardo Borlini, Soft Law, Soft Organizations 
72. Id. at 379-80. 
73. FATF Recommendations, supra note 10. 
74. See ROSE, supra note 3, at 191. 
75. GILMORE, supra note 15, at 133-141; Gadinis, supra note 4, at 28-32. 
76. Transformation of soft law into conventional law is not a rare occurrence. For further 
considerations on this speciﬁc kind of “hardening” of soft law, see Treves, supra note 4, at 137-39. 
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criminal rules, preventive administrative and ﬁnancial measures, and 
measures to ensure transparency on the ownership of legal persons and 
arrangements. Moreover, the Recommendations enjoin the members 
to create ad hoc authorities with appropriate functions, powers, and 
mechanisms for cooperation, and strengthen their cooperation with 
other countries.77 In 2012, the FATF updated the content of the 
Recommendations by speciﬁcally addressing the following issues: (i) 
AML/CTF policies and coordination; (ii) money laundering and con­
ﬁscation; (iii) terrorist ﬁnancing and proliferation;78 (iv) preventive 
measures (i.e., implementing regulatory tools to prevent the use of the 
ﬁnancial system for the purpose of money laundering, terrorist ﬁnanc­
ing, and other related crimes); (v) measures to ensure transparency on 
the ownership of legal persons and arrangements; (vi) the establish­
ment of competent authorities with appropriate functions; and (vii) 
improving powers, mechanisms, and arrangements to cooperate with 
other countries.79 
Recommendation 1 provides that countries should identify, assess, 
and understand the money laundering and terrorist ﬁnancing risks 
and ensure that measures to prevent or mitigate money laundering and 
terrorist ﬁnancing are commensurate with the identiﬁed risks.80 Coun­
tries should also require ﬁnancial institutions and designated non-
ﬁnancial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) to identify, assess, and 
take effective action to mitigate their money laundering or terrorist 
ﬁnancing risks.81 
Recommendation 2 is key to implementing the remaining FATF 
Recommendations because it deﬁnes the need to develop a national 
strategy based on a national risk assessment.82 In turn, this helps in 
setting AML/CTF public policies across different areas of government 
in line with the identiﬁed risks. Further, Recommendation 2 calls for 
countries to ensure that policy-makers, the ﬁnancial intelligence units 
(FIUs, as discussed below), law enforcement authorities, supervisors, 
and other relevant competent authorities, at the policy-making and 
77. See Vervaele, supra note 30, at 387-90. 
78. The second and the third elements above, thus, include both criminalization and 
strengthening the methods of tracing, freezing, and conﬁscating the proceeds of illegal activity. 
79. FATF Recommendations, supra note 10, at 16. 
80. Id. at 11. 
81. Id. Recommendation 1, in conjunction with its Interpretive Note, therefore, not only sets 
out the expectation that all countries will apply the risk-based approach to AML/CTF, but also 
contains new requirements for member countries and the private sector with regard to perform­
ing and updating risk assessments. 
82. Id. at 11. 
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operational levels, have effective mechanisms in place.83 These would 
enable them to cooperate and, where appropriate, coordinate domesti­
cally with each other concerning the development and implementa­
tion of policies and activities to combat money laundering, terrorist 
ﬁnancing, and the ﬁnancing of proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. To achieve such goals, Recommendation 2 urges the 
development of a national coordination plan.84 The FATF standards 
concern the inclusion as criminal offenses of a wide array of predicate 
offenses for money laundering, including “all serious offences,” orga­
nized crime, and terrorism.85 Recommendation 3 clearly stipulates that 
countries should criminalize money laundering on the basis of the 
U.N. Convention against the Illicit Trafﬁc in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances and the U.N. Convention against Transna­
tional Organized Crime and that they should apply the crime of money 
laundering to all serious offenses, with a view to including the widest 
range of predicate offenses.86 Recommendation 5 widens this obliga­
tion to terrorist ﬁnancing and the ﬁnancing of proliferation. Accord­
ingly, countries should criminalize on the basis of the U.N. Convention 
on the Suppression of Terrorist Financing not only the ﬁnancing of 
terrorist acts, but also the ﬁnancing of terrorist organizations and 
individual terrorists even in the absence of a link to a speciﬁc terrorist 
act or acts.87 Countries should ensure that such offenses are designed 
as money laundering predicate offenses. 
Several recommendations then impose preventive-administrative re­
quirements on speciﬁc categories of private persons and institutions. 
These recommendations deal with customer identiﬁcation and cus­
tomer due diligence (CDD), record-keeping, bank secrecy, and report­
ing of suspicious transactions. They are not only directed to ﬁnancial 
institutions like banks and insurance companies, but also casinos, 
notaries, accountants, lawyers, and companies selling and purchasing 
83. Id. 
84. Id. The ﬁrst paragraph of Recommendation 2 of the 2012 Standards provides that 
countries should regularly issue reviewed national AML/CTF policies informed by speciﬁc risk 
circumstances and “designate an authority or have a coordination or other mechanism . . .  respon­
sible for such policies.” Id. The second paragraph of Recommendation 2 requires countries to 
have mechanisms that enable competent authorities to cooperate and coordinate concerning the 
development of AML/CTF strategies, at both policy and mass destruction. Id. 
85. Id. at 12. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 13. 
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real estate assets, art, antiquities, and precious metals.88 Their ﬁrst 
obligation is to learn the identity of their clients and to communicate 
suspicious transactions. According to these requirements, any ﬁnancial 
institution related with ﬂows of assets should record the identity of 
their clients.89 
In addition, Recommendations 26-28 deal with the regulation and 
supervision of ﬁnancial institutions and DNFBPs and the powers of 
supervisors.90 The FATF standards also provide that every country 
should have ﬁnancial intelligence units (FIUs), which are the public 
reporting institutions in charge of analyzing and investigating the 
suspicious transactions reports ﬁled by the obliged entities.91 Recom­
mendations 31 and 32 lay down the enforcement powers that FATF 
Members should grant to judicial investigative bodies. Finally, states 
must also adopt effective international cooperation measures in the 
criminal ﬁeld, namely mutual legal-assistance requests for the taking of 
evidence, extradition, penalty execution, decisions of conﬁscation, and 
extinction of ownership.92 
Taking all these elements into account, it is evident that the money 
laundering and terrorist ﬁnancing counter-measures devised by the 
FATF constitute a new paradigm of security governance, achieved 
through three principal methods: criminalization, consisting of the 
emergence of new criminal offenses; “responsibilization,” consisting of 
the mobilization of the private sector to cooperate with the authorities 
in the ﬁght against money laundering; and private sector information, 
which will be administered by the FIUs. Overall, the international 
AML/CTF regime shaped by the FATF standards is thus characterized 
by a multidisciplinary approach mainly developed as two tracks: mea­
sures aimed at repressing money laundering and terrorist ﬁnancing 
and those designed to prevent proceeds of crime from entering into 
the legitimate ﬁnancial system.93 This model has been adopted in the 
88. As money laundering/terrorist ﬁnancing often requires the services of a lawyer, profes­
sional associations have often adopted voluntary codes of conduct containing obligations on 
money laundering. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASSOC., VOLUNTARY GOOD PRACTICES GUIDANCE FOR LAWYERS TO 
DETECT AND COMBAT MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING (Apr. 23, 2010). 
89. FATF Recommendations, supra note 10, at 15. 
90. Id. at 23-24. 
91. Id. at 24. 
92. Id. at 27-30. 
93. The two groups of measures are strongly intertwined. For example, as also emphasised by 
Recital 7 of the Third EU AML Directive, a deﬁnition of money laundering based on a broad 
range of predicate offenses “facilitates the reporting of suspicious transactions and international 
cooperation in this area,” that is to say one of the most typical obligations of the AML/CTF 
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AML/CTF legislation of most countries and also the EU. In this 
respect, Mitsilegas and Gilmore assert that, “[s]o far, the symbiotic 
relationship between the development of money laundering counter­
measures in international fora and the evolution of such measures in 
the EC/EU has been amply demonstrated.”94 However, the accommo­
dation of the criminal and preventive components of such standards 
within the EU has followed two different patterns, which must be 
addressed separately. 
IV. INCORPORATING INTERNATIONAL CRIMINALIZATION STANDARDS IN EU
 
MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING LEGISLATION
 
A. The Prohibition of AML in EU Secondary Legislation 
Similar to the U.N., the Council of Europe, and the FATF, the EU 
has developed AML/CTF policy that is predicated on prevention and 
criminalization. The EU was the ﬁrst regional organization to adopt a 
comprehensive AML/CTF regulatory framework. However, due to EU 
member states’ signiﬁcant competence in criminal matters, criminaliza­
tion turned out to be more problematic than prevention. Under EU 
law, there is no uniform deﬁnition of this criminal offense nor a 
harmonized sanctions system.95 In the context of the negotiations of 
the First AML Directive, the European Commission and the member 
states agreed to prohibit, instead of criminalize, money laundering at the 
EU level.96 However, this Directive also contained a declaration urging 
the member states to criminalize money laundering.97 The subsequent 
AML directives adopted the same approach.98 These instruments also 
stipulated deﬁnitions of money laundering and terrorist ﬁnancing, 
similar to those in the relevant EU secondary legislation, like the EU 
preventive strategy. Directive 2005/60/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
October 2005 on the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing, 2005 O.J. (L 309) 15, Recital 7 [hereinafter Third AML/CTF 
Directive]. 
94. Valsamis Mitsilegas & Bill Gilmore, The EU Legislative Framework against Money Laundering 
and Terrorist Finance: A Critical Analysis in the Light of Evolving Global Standards, 56 INT’L & COMP. 
L. Q. 119, 135 (2007). 
95. Borlini, supra note 9, at 16. 
96. Id. at 136. 
97. Money laundering was soon criminalised in all member states. See MITSILEGAS, supra note 
15, at 65. 
98. Directive 2001/97/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 Dec. 2001 
Amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC on Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for 
the Purpose of Money Laundering, 2001 O.J. (L 344) 76 [hereinafter Second AML Directive]. 
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directive on the freezing and conﬁscation of instrumentalities and 
proceeds of crime adopted in 2014.99 
That being said, the lack of a pan-European deﬁnition of money 
laundering remains problematic as it can bring about inconsistencies 
in the implementation of EU secondary legislation in domestic legal 
systems. Notably, the persistent disagreement about the identiﬁcation 
of predicate offenses might jeopardize the cross-border enforcement of 
money laundering criminal rules.100 
European Comm’n, Indicative Roadmap for a Proposal to Harmonize the Criminal Offence of 
Money Laundering in the EU (Oct. 2012), http://web.archive.org/web/20150928114057/ec.europa. 
eu/smart-regulation/impact/planned_ia/docs/2013_home_006_money_laundering_en.pdf. 
B. The Deﬁnition of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing under EU 
Law 
The deﬁnitions of money laundering and terrorist ﬁnancing under 
the law of the European Community (EC)/EU have followed two 
rather different patterns. The notion of terrorist ﬁnancing recently 
appeared in the EU legal system. Article 1(5) of the Fourth AML/CTF 
Directive deﬁnes, in a rather detailed manner, the notion of “ﬁnanc­
ing” and then refers to Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA to 
identify terroristic conducts.101 
By contrast, the notion of money laundering under EC/EU law has 
increased its scope over time. The First AML Directive only required 
the member states to criminalize the laundering of drug trafﬁcking’s 
proﬁt.102 By referring to Article 6 of the 1990 Council of Europe 
99. Directive 2014/42/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 
on the Freezing and Conﬁscation of Instrumentalities and Proceeds of Crime in the European 
Union, 2014 O.J. (L 127) 39. 
100. 
101. Directive (EU) 2015/849, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 
2015 on the Prevention and the Use of the Financial System for the Purposes of Money 
Laundering or Terrorist Financing, Amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, and Repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC, 2015 O.J. (L 141) 83, art. 1(5) 
[hereinafter Fourth AML/CTF Directive]; see also Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA, 
arts. 1-4, 2002 O.J. (L 164) 3-7 (EC). “Terrorist ﬁnancing” is deﬁned as “the provision or collection 
of funds, by any means, directly or indirectly, with the intention that they be used or in the 
knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out any of the offences 
within the meaning of Articles 1 to 4 of Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA.” Fourth 
AML/CTF Directive, supra, art. 1(5). The concept of terrorism offenses is a combination of two 
elements: an objective element, as it refers to a list of serious criminal conducts, as deﬁned by 
reference to national law, and a subjective element, as these acts shall be deemed to be terrorist 
offenses when committed with a speciﬁc intent. 
102. First AML Directive, supra note 11. 
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Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Conﬁscation of the 
Proceeds from Crime, the 1998 joint action broadened the notion of 
money laundering.103 In particular, it deﬁned money laundering as 
“any criminal offence as a result of which proceeds were generated that 
may become the subject of an offence.”104 The Framework Decision of 
June 26, 2001,105 introduced a new notion of money laundering, which 
encompassed all offenses punishable by deprivation of liberty or a 
detention order for a maximum of more than one year; or, for those 
states which have a minimum threshold for offenses in their legal 
system, offenses punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention 
order for a minimum of more than six months.106 
Similarly, the Fourth AML/CTF Directive lays down a rather broad 
deﬁnition of money laundering,107 whereby money laundering occurs 
regardless of whether the predicate crime was perpetrated in another 
EU Member State or in a third country.108 In turn, the notion of 
predicate crimes includes “any kind of criminal involvement in the 
commission of serious crimes.”109 These certainly include, amongst 
others, drug trafﬁcking (the only crime mentioned in the 1991 Direc­
tive), organized crime (as deﬁned in the 1998 joint action), fraud (as 
deﬁned in the EU Fraud Convention),110 corruption, and tax evasion. 
Although the deﬁnition of money laundering has expanded over 
time, more can be done to synchronize enforcement efforts. The next 
section will consider the prospects for further harmonization by the EU 
in this ﬁeld. 
103. Joint Action of 3 December 1998, Adopted by the Council on the Basis of Article K.3 of 
the Treaty on European Union, on Money Laundering, the Identiﬁcation, Tracing, Freezing, 
Seizing and Conﬁscation of the Instrumentalities and the Proceeds of Crime, 1998 O.J. (L 333) 1 
[hereinafter Joint Action of 3 December 1998]. 
104. Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Conﬁscation of the 
Proceeds from Crime, art. 1(e), Nov. 8, 1990, E.T.S. No. 141 (entered into force Sept. 1, 1993). 
105. Council Framework Decision 2001/500/JHA of 26 June 2001, on Money Laundering, 
the Identiﬁcation, Tracing, Freezing, Seizing and Conﬁscation of Instrumentalities and the 
Proceeds of Crime, 2001 O.J. (L 182) 1-2. 
106. Borlini, supra note 9, at 18. 
107. Fourth AML/CTF Directive, supra note 101, art. 1(3) (including any manipulation of 
property derived from the predicate offences, whether to conceal its origin, location, disposition, 
movement, ownership or any other rights with respect to the property). 
108. Id. art. 1(4). 
109. Id. art. 3(4). 
110. See Council Act of 26 July 1995, Drawing Up the Convention on the Protection of the 
European Communities’ Financial Interests, 1995 O.J. (C 316) 49-57. 
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C. Criminalizing Laundering Crimes at the European Level? 
The Lisbon Treaty introduced Article 83 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which provides a speciﬁc 
legal basis for the adoption of EU secondary legislation aimed to 
ﬁght111 “particularly serious” crimes “having a cross-border dimension 
resulting from the nature or impact of such offences or from a special 
need to combat them on a common basis” (known as “Eurocrimes”).112 
Notably, the EU can adopt directives to set common criteria concern­
ing criminal offenses and establish the appropriate sanctions. 
However, when the EU enacted stricter rules against money launder­
ing and terrorist ﬁnancing in May 2015, it invoked Article 114 TFEU— 
that is to say, the legal basis for harmonization of rules—instead of 
Article 83 TFEU. Similar to the directives of the pre-Lisbon era, these 
measures aimed to address the increased risk of money laundering and 
ﬁnancial crimes stemming from deeper market integration in the 
EU.113 Notably, the AML/CTF directives establish a speciﬁc regime for 
a number of sensitive economic sectors to prevent money laundering 
and terrorism ﬁnancing.114 Nevertheless, Article 83(1) TFEU might 
constitute the legal basis to enact criminal legislation to complete the 
existing legislative framework. As observed above, EU legislation pro­
vides for a minimum degree of harmonization of the constitutive 
elements and penalties for crimes, including money laundering, under 
Article 83(1).115 Although providing a single legal basis for the adop­
tion of EU secondary legislation in such a vast and diverse array of ﬁelds 
may be problematic,116 Article 83(1) of the TFEU may be conducive to 
illegalizing new forms of “Eurocrimes,”117 whose perpetration requires 
a common enterprise and an existing infrastructure. In such instances, 
harmonization is crucial in that it seeks “to create those deﬁnitions 
111. See Ester Herlin-Karnell, EU Competence in Criminal Law after Lisbon, in EU LAW AFTER 
LISBON 343 (Andrea Biondi, Piet Eeckhout & Stefanie Ripley eds., 2012). 
112. VALSAMIS MITSILEGAS, EU CRIMINAL LAW 107-10 (2009). 
113. Borlini, supra note 9, at 22. 
114. See Maria Bergstro¨m,  EU Anti-Money Laundering Regulation: Multilevel Cooperation of Public 
and Private Actors, in CRIME WITHIN THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE: A EUROPEAN PUBLIC 
ORDER 97 (Christina Eckes & Theodore Konstadinides eds., 2011). 
115. Council Framework Decision 2001/500/JHA, supra note 105. 
116. ESTER HERLIN-KARNELL, THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION OF EUROPEAN CRIMINAL LAW 
175-77 (2012); see also STEVE PEERS, EU JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS 780-803 (3d ed. 2011); SAMULI 
MIETTINEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 145-75 (2013). 
117. Mariana Chaves, EU’s Harmonization of National Criminal Law: Between Punitiveness and 
Moderation, 21 EUR. PUB. L. 527, 544-45 (2015). 
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which act as a starting point for Member States to take criminal 
offences further.”118 A possible EU directive harmonizing the notion of 
money laundering at the EU level, particularly through a more accu­
rate deﬁnition of the relevant predicate crimes, would help forge a 
common understanding of this criminal offense. Consequently, this 
would facilitate transnational investigations, reduce ﬁrms’ compliance 
costs for the adoption of preventive AML/CTF measures, and enhance 
the cooperation among member states’ police, judiciaries, and FIUs.119 
Notwithstanding the EU harmonizing intervention and, notably, the 
Third and Fourth AML/CTF Directives, EU member states’ criminal 
laws still largely differ. In response to these persistent divergences 
between domestic legislations, the Commission put forward a legisla­
tive proposal amending the 2001 Framework Decision on money 
laundering and conﬁscation of proceeds of crime proposal in the 
context of its 2010 Action Plan implementing the Stockholm Pro­
gramme.120 In 2012, the Commission drew a roadmap for a proposal of 
a legislative act to be adopted on the basis of Article 83(1). Its objective 
was twofold: harmonizing the deﬁnition of money laundering across 
EU member states’ legal systems and replacing the 2001 framework 
decision.121 This legislative proposal would have completed the efforts 
at the EU level to tackle money laundering, and, in particular, the 
Third AML/CTF Directive. 
After the publication of the Commission’s roadmap for the proposal 
of a harmonization directive, the Commission’s Directorate-General 
(DG) for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship, and Small and 
Medium-sized Enterprises consulted the Committee on the Prevention 
of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing and issued the Report 
on the Application of the Third Anti-Money Laundering Directive.122 
Despite the favorable opinion of several EU bodies, including EUROPOL, 
member states refused to endorse the project of a directive harmonizing 
domestic legislation on money laundering.123 
118. MARCO ARNONE & LEONARDO S. BORLINI, CORRUPTION: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND INTERNA­
TIONAL LAW 240 (2014); see also HERLIN-KARNELL, supra note 116, at 335-35; PEERS, supra note 116, at 
297. 
119. See supra Section III.B. 
120. Action Plan on the Stockholm Program, COM (2010) 171 ﬁnal (Sept. 15, 2017). 
121. Joint Action of 3 December 1998, supra note 103, at 3. 
122. European Commission Press Release MEMO/12/246, European Commission Report 
on the Application of the Third Anti-Money Laundering Directive - Frequently Asked Questions 
(Apr. 11, 2012). 
123. See Alexandre Met-Domestici, The Reform of the Fight against Money Laundering in the EU, 3  
EUCRIM 89, 90 (2013). 
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D. Forward-looking Remarks 
Formally, the 2015 AML/CTF framework does not constitute crimi­
nal law competence stricto sensu, “but rather found its expression in the 
notion of administrative penalties.”124 Still, this framework inﬂuences 
both administrative and criminal national rules and procedures and 
deploys both criminal and administrative law enforcement tools.125 As 
a result, it does not leave the national criminal justice system altogether 
unaltered and complements national criminal law. Although the EU 
has not yet adopted a harmonization directive based on Article 83(1), 
its AML/CTF legislation has undeniably contributed to an increase of 
criminalization of money laundering and terrorist ﬁnancing within the 
member states and the extension of the pertinent category of predicate 
offenses. 
Needless to say, the terrorist attacks recently occurred on European 
soil gave new impetus to the adoption of legislation based on Article 83 
TFEU.126 After the Paris attacks of November 2015, EU institutions and 
national governments decided to take further action. Thus, in Decem­
ber 2015, the Commission tabled a proposal for a directive on combat­
ing terrorism which comprehensively criminalizes the acts of ﬁnancing 
of terrorist attacks and their preparation, as well as—this being the 
major novelty—the ﬁnancing of activities such as recruitment, training, 
and the funding of travel abroad for terrorism purposes.127 
In a similar vein, the European Commission has looked at how to 
improve the current AML/CTF legislation and has sped up initiatives 
for this purpose. As a result, in February 2016, it issued a complex 
action plan to strengthen the ﬁght against terrorist ﬁnancing.128 
European Comm’n, Action Plan to Strengthen the Fight against Terrorist Financing (Feb. 
2016), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/ﬁles/aml-factsheet_en.pdf (factsheet). 
Among 
the different actions planned for the second half of 2016, the Commis­
sion plans to table a proposal for new EU legislation based on Article 
83(1) to harmonize the criminal sanctions for money laundering.129 
This legislation rests on the following assumptions, already illustrated 
in the present paper: (i) terrorists often resort to criminal proceeds to 
124. Ester Herlin-Karnel, The Lisbon Treaty and the Area of Criminal Law and Justice, 3 EUR. POL’Y 
ANALYSIS 1, 9 (2008). 
125. Borlini, supra note 9, at 24. 
126. Id. at 25. 
127. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Combating Terrorism 
and Replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on Combating Terrorism, at 18, COM (2015) 
625 ﬁnal (Feb. 12, 2015). 
128. 
129. Borlini, supra note 9, at 25. 
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fund their activities and use laundering schemes to convert, conceal, or 
acquire such proceeds; (ii) although all member states have criminal­
ized money laundering, there are differences between member states 
as to the deﬁnition of the crime and the sanctions applied; and (iii) 
these differences create obstacles in cross-border judicial and police 
cooperation to tackle money laundering and are directly relevant to 
action against terrorist ﬁnancing.130 
V. THE REFORM OF THE EU FRAMEWORK ON THE PREVENTION OF MONEY
 
LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING
 
A. The New EU AML/CTF Preventive Framework 
The EU AML/CTF framework not only seeks to harmonize national 
criminal legislation on money laundering, but also seeks to introduce 
common preventive rules. The “preventive arm” of the EU regulatory 
framework includes a vast array of administrative and ﬁnancial mea­
sures designed to bar proceeds of crime from entering the legal 
ﬁnancial system. The reform of EU AML/CTF legislation was prompted 
by the need to comply with new FATF Recommendations on the matter 
and the need to address the drawbacks of the AML/CTF Directive.131 
Yet, the reform process has been fraught with difﬁculties. Due to the 
sensitiveness of the matter,132 the adoption of the Fourth AML/CTF 
Directive has been repeatedly delayed.133 
The new EU legislation seeks to reconcile two different dimensions. 
On the one hand, it emphasizes the need to enhance international 
coordination to tackle an inherently transnational crime, such as 
130. European Comm’n, Action Plan to Strengthen the Fight against Terrorist Financing, supra 
note 128. 
131. While the Directive 2015/489 enjoys pride of place in the efforts of the EU to prevent 
money laundering and to curb terrorist ﬁnancing, it is not comprehensive in its coverage. The 
Directive and Regulation 2015/847 are part of a broader set of legislative measures including 
Commission Regulation 1889/2005, 2005 O.J. (L 309) 9 (requiring persons entering or leaving 
the EU to declare cash sums they are carrying if the value amounts to €10,000 or more); Council 
Decision 2000/642 of 17 October 2000, Concerning Arrangements for Cooperation between 
Financial Intelligence Units of the Member States in Respect of Exchanging Information, 2000 
O.J. (L 271) 4; Directive 2007/64/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
November 2007 on Payment Services in the Internal Market Amending Directives 97/7/EC, 
2002/65/EC, 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and Repealing Directive 97/5/EC, 2007 O.J. (L 319) 
1; and a number of EU legal instruments imposing sanctions and restrictive measures on 
governments of third countries or non-state entities and individuals. 
132. MELISSA VAN DEN BROEK, PREVENTING MONEY LAUNDERING: A LEGAL STUDY ON THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF SUPERVISION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 16 (2015). 
133. Id. 
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money laundering. In particular, the AML/CTF Directive’s preamble 
clearly states: 
Money laundering and terrorist ﬁnancing are frequently car­
ried out in an international context. Measures adopted solely at 
national or even at Union level, without taking into account 
international coordination and cooperation, would have very 
limited effect. The measures adopted by the Union in that ﬁeld 
should therefore be compatible with, and at least as stringent 
as, other actions undertaken in international fora. Union ac­
tion should continue to take particular account of the FATF 
Recommendations and instruments of other international bod­
ies active in the ﬁght against money laundering and terrorist 
ﬁnancing.134 
On the other hand, the ultimate objective of this instrument remains 
the enhancement of market integration. This is particularly evident if 
one considers that the EU adopted Article 114 TFEU (approximation 
of laws) as a legal basis for the Fourth AML/CTF Directive and 
Regulation 2015/847 on the information concerning fund transfers.135 
To attain these objectives, the reform sought to grant a more signiﬁ­
cant role to private actors and embrace a risk-based approach. More­
over, it introduced stricter transparency obligations with respect to the 
ownership of legal persons and arrangements and to improve coordina­
tion among the national FIUs. 
The following analysis aims at assessing the main elements of the 
current EU AML/CTF preventive framework. Notably, it ﬁrst takes a 
bird’s eye view of the current regulatory framework. Then, it looks into 
the involvement of private actors and related problems from a funda­
mental freedoms and rights perspective. 
B. Enlarging the Scope of the Directive 
Similar to previous amendments,136 the recent reform of the EU 
AML/CTF framework enlarged both ratione materiae and ratione personae. 
134. Fourth AML/CTF Directive, supra note 101, Recital 4. 
135. The CJEU has clearly stated that measures adopted on the basis of Art. 114 TFEU must 
genuinely have as their object the improvement of the conditions for the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market. See Case C-376/98, Germany v. Parliament and Council, 2000 
E.C.R. I-8419, ¶ 83. 
136. See Mitsilegas & Gilmore, supra note 94, at 119-22. 
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In terms of the former, the Fourth AML/CTF Directive lowers the cash 
payment threshold from €15,000 to €10,000,137 thereby going even 
beyond the threshold set out in the FATF Recommendations.138 
In addition, following the approach of the newest FATF Recommen­
dations issued in 2012,139 it expressly includes tax crimes—be they 
related to direct or indirect taxation140—among predicate offenses. 
This policy choice also seems to be functional to the EU’s action against 
ﬁnancial crimes.141 Nevertheless, it should be noted that tax crimes 
were already included under the previous directive insofar as they 
constituted serious crimes punishable by deprivation of liberty or a 
detention order for a maximum of more than one year. Therefore, the 
explicit reference to tax crimes is a symbolic choice that reveals the EU 
institutions’ stronger political will to ﬁght tax fraud and tax evasion.142 
The reform further enlarges the scope ratione personae of AML/CTF 
legislation. First, it increases the number of obliged entities (i.e., 
entities subject to the AML/CTF obligations). For instance, it includes 
the providers of gambling services among obliged entities. In this 
respect, it seems to be consistent with the incremental pattern that has 
characterized AML legislation.143 While Directive 91/308/EEC in­
cluded only bankers and ﬁnancial institutions, the Second AML Direc­
tive added legal professionals, casinos, remittance ofﬁces, and insur­
ance companies.144 The Third AML/CTF Directive widened the scope 
even more, including for the ﬁrst time trusts and company service 
providers.145 
Secondly, the Fourth AML/CTF Directive also imposes preventive 
obligations on a larger number of subjects. Notably, it broadens the 
category of politically exposed persons (PEPs) by adopting additional 
137. Fourth AML/CTF Directive, supra note 101, Recital 6. The proposal of the Commission 
provided for an even lower limit of 7,500 euros, but some member states considered it as an 
inappropriate limitation to the use of cash. 
138. FATF Recommendations, supra note 10, at 19. 
139. FATF Recommendations, supra note 10, at 12. 
140. Fourth AML/CTF Directive, supra note 101, art. 3(4)(f). 
141. The main caveat is that the complexity of national tax laws and their differences make it 
extremely problematic for professionals of the ﬁnancial intermediaries and other designated 
subjects to analyze transactions and assess the risk level of related money laundering. 
142. Delphine Langlois, The Revision of the EU Framework on the Prevention of Money Laundering, 
3 EUCRIM 96, 97-98 (2013). 
143. See, e.g., Borlini, supra note 9, at 29. 
144. Second AML Directive, supra note 98, at 79. On the extent to which lawyer must 
contribute to AML/CTF obligations, see infra Section V.E. 
145. Borlini, supra note 9, at 34. 
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provisions on PEPs at the domestic level and those working for interna­
tional organizations (including the EU).146 Pursuant to Directive 2006/ 
70/EC, PEPs are “natural persons who are or have been entrusted with 
prominent public functions,”147 as well as their family members and 
their associates, as long as they share the beneﬁcial ownership of legal 
entities or have any kind of close business relationships.148 The status of 
PEP ceases to apply one year after the end of an individual’s time in 
ofﬁce.149 By enlarging the number of persons subject to the PEP’s 
regime, the directive in question seeks to minimize the risk that these 
persons can take advantage of their positions to commit money launder­
ing/terrorist ﬁnancing. 
C. Increasing Effectiveness: The Public-Private Partnership and the
 
Strengthened RBA
 
As observed above in Section IV.A, the Fourth AML/CTF Directive is 
predicated on a more effective involvement of private parties and on a 
risk-based approach.150 This objective is pursued by means of a wide 
array of instruments. These include stringent obligations on customer 
identiﬁcation, CDD, record-keeping, and reporting of suspicious trans­
actions. Such delegation “has opened up for changed roles for private 
actors in the public sector.”151 The public sector and, notably, public 
regulatory/supervisory bodies are entrusted only with the obligation to 
enforce these obligations.152 
The Fourth AML/CTF Directive embraces the RBA by deploying 
ﬂexible requirements with a view to lightening the burden on market 
participants and facilitate delivery of regulatory actions.153 The RBA 
146. Fourth AML/CTF Directive, supra note 101, arts. 20-23. 
147. Commission Directive 2006/70/EC of 1 August 2006, Laying Down Implementing 
Measures for Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as Regards 
the Deﬁnition of “Politically Exposed Person” and the Technical Criteria for Simpliﬁed Customer 
Due Diligence Procedures and for Exemption on Grounds of a Financial Activity Conducted on 
an Occasional or Very Limited Basis, art. 2, 2006 O.J. (L 214) 29. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. See supra Sections I.D, I.F. 
151. Maria Bergstro¨m, Karin Svedberg Helgesson & Ulrika Mo¨rth, A New Role for For-Proﬁt 
Actors? The Case of Anti-Money Laundering and Risk Management, 49 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 1043, 
1044 (2001). 
152. See HEBA SHAMS, LEGAL GLOBALIZATION: MONEY LAUNDERING LAW AND OTHER CASES 80 
(2004). 
153. Earlier, the focus was on enhancing the sanctioning power of regulators (ruled-based 
approach), whereas, since the adoption of the FATF Revised Recommendations in 2003—and, 
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approach presupposes that the components (although not necessarily 
all of them) of the AML/CTF system—especially regulation, compli­
ance, and control—should be framed in light of the risks that they are 
intended to address. The regulatory framework embraces a risk-based 
approach. Thus, it is based on high-level legislation setting out the 
main objectives to be pursued through the application of speciﬁc rules 
of conduct, which “need in many instances to be determined by the 
obliged parties themselves in light of the concrete circumstances and 
inherent risks.”154 
The EU’s AML policy proves that the RBA is generally more efﬁcient 
than the rule-based approach—that is, a system of AML rules that does 
not take into consideration the different nature and risk proﬁles of 
enterprises.155 For one thing, it has the advantage of allowing obliged 
entities a relatively simple and cheap ordinary procedure for retail 
banking and cases without speciﬁc risk factors in general. Instead, as 
the level of risk increases, the obliged entities are expected to collect 
information about clients, particularly by means of clients’ inter­
views.156 These interviews concern the source of the wealth, the pos­
sible destination, and the economic rationale of a given transaction.157 
If a given transaction appears to be devoid of a reasonable justiﬁcation, 
the obliged entity should ask for additional explanation.158 In case 
uncertainty remains or suspicion is raised, the obliged institutions have 
to report to the FIUs.159 
Altogether, the RBA approach has a two-fold effect: it makes the 
regulation more ﬂexible and intensiﬁes the responsibilities of ﬁnancial 
intermediaries and the other designated private subjects. These sub­
jects, under the supervision of public regulators, design and implement 
a model of AML/CTF controls. In so doing, regulators set out the 
even more distinctly with their last revision in 2012—it has been commonly accepted that a greater 
role for self-regulation of the interested sectors and individual institutions is needed. See PIETH & 
AIOLFI, supra note 39, at 13-14. 
154. Paolo Costanzo, The Risk-Based Approach to Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist 
Financing in International and EU Standards: What It Is, What It Entails, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
MONEY LAUNDERING, supra note 24, at 349, 352. 
155. For a critique of the rule-based approach, see Masciandaro, supra note 36. See also Report 
from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Application of Directive 
2005/60/EC on the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering and 
Terrorist Financing, COM (2012) 168 ﬁnal (Apr. 11, 2012). 
156. Borlini, supra note 9, at 31. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. 
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criteria to screen ﬁnancial institutions’ and other obliged subjects’ 
clients and can even reshape the internal structure of ﬁnancial institu­
tions to enhance their capacity to prevent money laundering and 
terrorist ﬁnancing risks.160 
The new EU provisions also provide for a more targeted RBA using 
evidenced-based risk assessments to be conducted by the Commission 
and member states,161 as well as guidance by the European supervisory 
authorities (ESAs).162 This approach also entails stricter and clearer 
rules on CDD in accordance with the latest FATF Recommendations. 
Under these new rules, banks and other obliged subjects must put in 
place adequate controls and procedures to gather information about 
their customers and their business relationship, and conduct constant 
monitoring thereof.163 Of particular relevance is the identiﬁcation of 
the beneﬁcial owner of the fund, namely the “natural person(s) who 
ultimately owns or controls the customer and/or . . . on whose  behalf a 
transaction or activity is conducted.”164 The expression “on behalf” is to 
be interpreted in an extensive manner in order to “help in the 
detection of more suspicious transactions.”165 Not surprisingly, the 
identiﬁcation of the beneﬁcial owner may prove to be extremely 
difﬁcult and time-consuming due to the complexity of corporate 
structures, which often include offshore companies.166 
When carrying out these monitoring activities, the obliged entities 
enjoy a wide margin of discretion, and the intensity of scrutiny varies 
according to the level of risk.167 For instance, decisions on when and 
how to undertake simpliﬁed and laxer CDD will have to be justiﬁed on 
the basis of the low risk of transactions or customer relationships. In 
160. Fourth AML/CTF Directive, supra note 101, arts. 45-46. 
161. The Commission and member states shall conduct periodic risk assessments on money 
laundering and terrorist ﬁnancing risks, respectively, affecting the EU Internal Market and 
relating to cross-border activities and within national jurisdictions, with a view to devising 
regulatory and policy options (so-called “macro” risk assessments). The underlying rationale is 
that in order to shape AML/CTF defences through regulation and policy, regard must be given to 
risk factors in the overall European or national context, as opposed to those related to speciﬁc 
situations which are to be performed by obliged subjects (so-called “micro” risk assessments). See 
Fourth AML/CTF Directive, supra note 101, arts. 6-8. 
162. The Commission’s risk assessments will take into account the joint opinion of the 
European Bank Authority, European Insurance and Occupational Authority, and the European 
Securities and Markets Authority. See id. art. 6(5). 
163. Id. art. 13. 
164. Id. art. 3(6). 
165. Met-Domestici, supra note 123, at 92. 
166. See, e.g., Borlini, supra note 9, at 32. 
167. Fourth AML/CTF Directive, supra note 101, arts. 18-24. 
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this regard, it is worth noting that the ESAs must adopt guidelines on 
simpliﬁed CDD no later than two years after the directive enters into 
force.168 These new instruments adopt a more risk-based approach that 
should ensure a more efﬁcient and cost-effective assessment of money 
laundering and terrorist ﬁnancing risks.169 
According to the European Council, the rules on CDD “reﬂect the 
need for the EU to adapt its legislation to take account of the develop­
ment of technology and other means at the disposals of criminals.”170 
For this reason, in the EU Terrorist Financing Action Plan, the Commis­
sion has sought to harden the CDD obligations of the 2015 Directive by 
introducing stricter and more uniform due diligence measures for 
high-risk third countries (i.e., third countries with deﬁciencies in the 
ﬁght against money laundering and terrorist ﬁnancing to be identiﬁed 
in an EU “blacklist”).171 The new plan aims at tackling new kinds of 
risks, such as those associated with virtual currency-exchange platforms 
and pre-paid instruments.172 
D. Towards Greater Effectiveness and Transparency 
The Fourth AML Directive also seeks to ensure greater effectiveness 
and transparency of AML disciplines. The former is pursued by enhanc­
ing cooperation between national enforcement authorities and by 
strengthening the sanction system of the national enforcement authori­
ties. First, member states must favor cooperation among FIUs “regard­
less of their organizational status”173 and call meetings of member 
states’ FIUs.174 Second, domestic enforcement authorities are endowed 
with more pervasive sanctioning powers vis-a-vis`  ﬁnancial institu­
tions.175 Further, the Directive establishes a “baseline sanction” for 
168. Id. art. 15. 
169. Borlini, supra note 9, at 33. 
170. European Council Press Release IP/15/187, Money laundering: Council approves 
strengthened rules (Apr. 20, 2015). 
171. Id. 
172. See European Comm’n, Action Plan to Strengthen the Fight against Terrorist Financing, supra 
note 128. 
173. Fourth AML/CTF Directive, supra note 101, art. 52. Due to the freedom left by the third 
EU AML/CTF Directive in this respect, in some member states, FIUs are independent administra­
tive bodies, whereas in others they are embedded within national police forces, or, in yet others, 
they are departments within a ministry. Such differences may hamper European cooperation 
among FIUs. For instance, when FIUs are part of the national police forces, the power to exchange 
information with their European counterparts may be subject to prior judicial authorization. 
174. Id. art. 51. 
175. Id. art. 59. 
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particularly grave and repeated violations of the obligations set out 
therein.176 Taken together, these provisions are likely to reduce the 
differences between the sanction systems of the EU member states.177 
On the other hand, the new and stricter transparency obligations 
primarily aim to prevent the establishment of complex corporate 
structures created for the sole purpose of circumventing AML/CTF 
obligations.178 To this end, similar to the FATF Recommendations,179 
the Fourth AML Directive stipulates that juridical persons must disclose 
their beneﬁcial owners and trustees, and keep tabs on their data.180 
In turn, these subjects are required to provide the relevant information 
to the competent regulatory authorities and private entities discharg­
ing their CDD duties. This information will also be recorded in 
national registers.181 Government bodies and FIUs may access this 
information without any restriction,182 while obliged entities may re­
quest the information that is necessary to carry out their CDD duties. 
The general public, instead, must demonstrate the existence of a 
“legitimate interest” in having access to such information.183 In this 
respect, it is worth noting that the lack of an express deﬁnition of this 
concept in the Directive is likely to compound the interpretative 
divergences between member states.184 
Press Release, Transparency Int’l, EU Agrees Money Laundering Transparency Re­
forms, but Full Access Denied (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.transparencyinternational.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2014/12/2014-12-17_PR-AMLD.pdf. 
E. The Balance with Protection of Fundamental Freedoms and Rights: The 
Emergence of a European Interest in an Effective AML/CTF Law 
As observed above, the development of EC/EU legislation on money 
laundering prevention and terrorist ﬁnancing has been primarily 
inspired by FATF standards.185 Some authoritatively argue that the 
176. Id. 
177. Langlois, supra note 142, at 97. 
178. See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, THE MISUSE OF CORPORATE VEHICLES INCLUDING TRUST AND 
COMPANY SERVICE PROVIDERS (2006). 
179. FATF Recommendations, supra note 10, at 22. 
180. Fourth AML/CTF Directive, supra note 101, art. 30(1). 
181. Id. arts. 30(3)-(5). 
182. Id. arts. 30(4)(a), (b). 
183. Id. arts. 30(4)(c), 31(4). The ﬁnal text thus struck a compromise between the initial 
positions of those who demanded full transparency (such as the European Parliament, which 
voted 640-30 in favour of public registers) and those who defended some secrecy for beneﬁcial 
owners (some member states led by Germany). 
184. 
185. Borlini, supra note 9, at 37. 
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“[u]ncritical introduction in the Union legal order of standards chal­
lenging fundamental rights produced by an elite body with little 
transparency in its work . . . raises  important issues of legitimacy and 
rule of law.”186 
Even without going that far, the accommodation within the EU legal 
order of such standards admittedly creates tensions with certain EU 
fundamental freedoms and rights. The issue is how to strike the right 
balance between the protection of such freedoms and rights and 
AML/CTF prevention. 
In Jyske Bank Gibraltar187 
Case C-212/11, Jyske Bank Gibraltar Ltd. v. Administracio´n del Estado, ¶¶ 58-61 (Apr. 
25, 2013), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62011CJ0212&lang1=en&type=TXT 
&ancre=. 
and Ordre des Barreaux188 the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) was asked to assess the compatibility of speciﬁc 
AML/CTF preventive measures with the freedom to provide services 
under Article 56 TFEU and the right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 6 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
The ruling in Ordre des Barreaux has been widely commented on by 
the European legal community.189 
Case C-305/05, Ordre des 
Barreaux Francophones et Germanophones et al. v. Conseil des Ministres, Judgement of the Court of Justice of 
26 June 2007, Grand Chamber; (2007) ECR I-5305, 46 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 301 (2009); Jan 
Koma´rek, Legal Professional Privilege and the EU’s Fight against Money Laundering, 27 CIV. JUST. Q. 13  
(2008). 
For the purposes of the present 
Article, it sufﬁces to recall that the ECJ ruling in Ordre des Barreaux 
precisely delimitated the obligation imposed on lawyers. There, the 
court stated that the obligation to report suspicious transactions should 
not apply to lawyers acting within the scope of legal counselling or 
judicial proceedings.190 
Case C-305/05, Ordre des Barreaux Francophones et Germanophone v. Conseil des 
Ministres, 2007 E.C.R. I-5305, ¶ 22. 
Since the adoption of the Second AML Direc­
tive, there have been attempts to balance the conﬂicting interests by 
covering notaries and independent legal professionals primarily in the 
context of ﬁnancial transactions.191 As a result, EU law exempts them 
from the Second AML Directive’s obligations when they ascertain the 
legal positions of their clients, or they represent their clients in legal 
proceedings.192 It has also done so by permitting member states to 
186. MITSILEGAS, supra note 112, at 313. 
187. 
188. Case C-305/05, Ordre des Barreaux Francophones et Germanophone v. Conseil des 
Ministres, 2007 E.C.R. I-5305, ¶ 16. 
189. See, e.g., Michiel J.J.P. Luchtman & Rob van der Hoeven, 
190. 
191. See Fourth AML/CTF Directive, supra note 101, art. 1(3)(b). 
192. Id. art. 34(2). 
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designate an appropriate self-regulatory body other than the FIU to 
receive suspicious transaction reports. These bodies shall then forward 
the information to the FIUs promptly and unﬁltered. Despite the 
existence of this mechanism, the reporting duties of lawyers were 
challenged before the Court of Justice of the European Union.193 
The Court found that the challenged provisions were consistent with 
Article 6 of the ECHR because the Directive exhaustively list the 
transaction for which lawyers are required to comply with information 
and cooperation obligations.194 
Case C-305/05, Ordre des Barreaux Francophones et Germanophone v. Conseil des 
Ministres, 2007 E.C.R. I-5305, ¶ 22. 
Second, referring to the exception of 
Article 6(3) of the Directive and solving a certain ambiguity in the text 
of this provision, the ECJ maintained that reporting obligations are 
limited to activities that take place “in a context with no link to judicial 
proceedings, and, consequently, those activities fall outside the scope 
of the right to a fair trial.”195 The exemptions concerning assistance in 
defending the client, representation before the courts, and advice as to 
the manner of instituting or avoiding judicial proceedings, therefore, 
safeguard the right of the client to a fair trial.196 
Two further considerations arise from the Ordre des Barreaux case. 
First, although not explicitly stated by the judges, Advocate General 
Poiares Maduro argued that “the objective of combating money laun­
dering has arisen ‘as an objective of general interest for the EU.’”197 
Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, Case C-305/05, Ordre des Barreaux 
Francophones et Germanophone v. Conseil des Ministres, 2007 E.C.R. I-05305, ¶ 78 (emphasis 
added). 
Second, AML/CTF obligations may come into conﬂict with Articles 6 
and 8 of the ECHR, as it is difﬁcult in practice to draw a line between 
lawyers’ activities related to a trial and lawyers’ activities unrelated to 
the conduct of judicial proceedings.198 In fact, judicial proceedings are 
but one area where legal privilege functions. So far, the question “has 
193. The ECJ was in fact referred to by the Belgian Constitutional Court, before which the 
Belgian Bar Association had argued that the duty to report—as disciplined by the Belgian 
legislation transposing the second AML Directive including Arts. 2(a)(5) and 6, whereby the 
Directive is applicable to notaries and other independent legal professionals when they assist 
clients in commercial or ﬁnancial activities—was in breach of lawyers’ professional conﬁdentiality 
and, hence, the right to a fair trial as protected by Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR). 
194. 
195. Id. ¶ 33. 
196. Id. ¶ 34. 
197. 
198. Borlini, supra note 9, at 40. 
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not been solved in non-contentious circumstances.”199 The Ordre des 
Barreaux case also reveals that the deﬁnition of “ascertaining the legal 
position for their client”—the second situation referred to by the 
Directive—is open to interpretation by national courts, which also 
contributes to the uncertain outcome of the case of “Reporting Duty v. 
Legal Privilege.”200 
The ruling in Jyske Bank Gibraltar is even more intriguing because the 
ECJ had to assess the compatibility of the EU AML/CTF framework 
with the freedom to provide services, one of the Union’s four fundamen­
tal freedoms shaping its internal market. In its landmark preliminary 
ruling addressing the implementation of the Third AML/CTF Direc­
tive in Spain, the court, on the one hand, conﬁrmed its usual “strict” 
approach in analyzing national measures which serve important inter­
ests recognized by the EU as valuable and capable of restricting one of 
the four fundamental freedoms.201 
Case C-212/11, Jyske Bank Gibraltar Ltd. v. Administracio´n del Estado, supra note 187, 
¶¶ 60-66. 
On the other hand, it seemed to 
base its judgment on a balance of interests that both appear genuinely 
European: the freedom to provide services, on the one hand, and the 
need of security and the protection of the internal market through 
the (national) implementation of the EU AML/CTF framework, on 
the other.202 
To fully grasp the relevance of the ruling at issue, it is worth 
summarizing its factual background. Jyske Bank was a branch of the 
Danish Jyske Bank established in Gibraltar, which operated in Spain 
under the rules governing the freedom to provide services.203 Article 
22(2) of the Third AML/CTF Directive—which will be replaced by the 
near identical Article 33(1) of the Fourth AML/CTF Directive— 
requires that information on suspicious transactions shall be forwarded 
to the FIUs “of the Member State in whose territory the institution or 
person forwarding the information is situated.”204 Pursuant to Spanish 
law, credit institutions operating in Spain must inform the Spanish FIU 
of transfers of more than €30,000 to or from tax havens and uncoopera­
tive territories, such as Gibraltar.205 Jyske bank complied with the 
199. Maaike Stouten & Andre´ Tilleman, Reporting Duty for Lawyers Versus Legal Privilege: 
Unresolved Tension, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MONEY LAUNDERING, supra note 24, at 426, 431. 
200. Id. 
201. 
202. Id. ¶¶ 43-57. 
203. Id. ¶ 22. 
204. Third AML/CTF Directive, supra note 93, at 27 (emphasis added). 
205. Case C-212/11, Jyske Bank Gibraltar Ltd. v. Administracio´n del Estado, supra note 187, ¶ 
20. Territories regarded as tax havens and uncooperative territories were speciﬁed by Royal 
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request forwarded by the Spanish FIU only partially, invoking the 
banking secrecy in force in Gibraltar, resulting in a ﬁne of €1,700,000. 
The bank appealed the decision before the Spanish Supreme Court, 
which referred the case to the ECJ.206 
Case C-212/11, Jyske Bank Gibraltar Ltd. v. Administracio´n del Estado, supra note 187, ¶ 2. 
The analysis of the Luxembourg-
based court was twofold. It ﬁrst examined Article 22 of the Third 
AML/CTF Directive and then Article 56 TFEU, although the domestic 
court did not refer to the latter provision in its question.207 
According to the judges, Article 22 of the Third AML/CTF Directive 
is rather clear and should be read: 
as meaning that the entities referred to must forward the 
requested information to the FIU of the Member State in whose 
territory they are situated, that is to say, in the case of operations 
performed under the rules on the freedom to provide services, 
to the FIU of the Member State of origin.208 
Yet, the ECJ stretched the limits of the provision by asserting that it 
“does not expressly prohibit” the host Member State from requiring a 
credit institution carrying out activities in its territory under the rules 
on the freedom to provide services to forward the information referred 
directly to its own FIU “in so far as such legislation seeks to 
strengthen . . . the  effectiveness of the ﬁght against money laundering and 
terrorist ﬁnancing.”209 According to the ECJ, however, credit institutions 
remain obliged to supply the required information to the FIU of the 
home state, which are in turn asked to cooperate with FIUs of other EU 
countries.210 
Regarding Article 56 TFEU, the ECJ afﬁrmed that a national mea­
sure such as the one adopted by Spain constitutes a restriction on the 
freedom to provide services when it implies costs and is additional to 
the controls already conducted in the Member State where the institu­
tion in question is situated.211 After concluding that there was indeed a 
restriction on the aforementioned freedom, the court assessed whether 
Decree 1080/1991 of 5 July 1991 (B.O.E. 1991, 167) (Spain) and by Order ECO/2652/2002 of 24 
October 2002, Implementing Reporting Obligations in respect of Transactions Conducted with 
Certain Countries, which Must Be Notiﬁed to the Executive Service of the Commission for the 
Prevention of Money Laundering and Monetary Offences (B.O.E. 2002, 260). Gibraltar is on this list. 
206. 
207. Id. ¶ 38. 
208. Id. ¶ 43. 
209. Id. ¶¶ 45, 49 (emphasis added). 
210. Id. ¶¶ 51, 54. 
211. Id. ¶ 60. 
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national legislation was justiﬁed by an “overriding requirement relating 
to the public interest” and whether the same legislation was appropri­
ate and proportional for securing the attainment of the aim it 
pursued.212 
As for the ﬁrst question, the ECJ afﬁrmed that the prevention and 
the combating of money laundering and terrorist ﬁnancing are “legiti­
mate aims”213: AML was already recognized as a public interest in a 
previous judgment concerning gambling services in France.214 The ECJ 
then determined that the national legislation was appropriate to attain 
the objective it pursues because domestic legislation like the Spanish 
one enables the member state concerned to require at any time, “where 
there is reasonable doubt as to the legality of a ﬁnancial transaction,” 
information necessary to pursue and punish alleged perpetrators of the 
crime and because it is non-discriminatory, as all operators are subject 
to similar obligations.215 
Case C-212/11, Jyske Bank Gibraltar Ltd. v. Administracio´n del Estado, supra note 
187, ¶ 65. 
The application of the proportionality test is more intriguing. Accord­
ing to the court’s reasoning, the mechanism of cooperation between 
FIUs presents some ﬂaws that impede authorities from acting quickly.216 
National legislation thus meets the standard of proportionality to the 
extent that it requires: 
[C]redit institutions situated in another Member State to for­
ward, concerning operations carried out under the freedom to 
provide services, information necessary for combating money 
laundering and terrorist ﬁnancing directly to the FIU of the 
host Member State, only where there is no effective mechanism 
ensuring full and complete cooperation between the FIUs and 
allowing money laundering and terrorist ﬁnancing to be com­
bated just as effectively.217 
The judges maintained that, at least for the time being, FIUs are not 
obliged to automatically forward information to the FIUs of another 
212. Id. 
213. Id. ¶ 62. 
214. Case C-212/08, Zeturf Ltd. v. Premier Ministre, 2011 E.C.R. I-5633, ¶¶ 45-46. 
215. 
216. Id. ¶¶ 73-75. 
217. Id. ¶ 81 (emphasis added). 
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Member State.218 Moreover, inasmuch as Spanish legislation was lim­
ited to operations exceeding €30,000 and involving transfers of funds 
from or toward certain territories, it did not appear to be disproportion­
ate.219 
Case C-212/11, Jyske Bank Gibraltar Ltd. v. Administracio´n del Estado, supra note 
187, ¶ 83. 
Interestingly, the court did not investigate the existence of less 
restrictive alternatives. Rather, it focused on the EU AML/CTF and 
considered AML/CTF as a “European” interest.220 In so doing, the ECJ 
assumes a genuine European perspective. 
F. The Uneasy Relationship between AML/CTF Law, the Right to Privacy, 
and Data Protection Law 
The problematic coexistence of the right to a fair trial and the 
freedom to provide service does not exhaust the list of possible interfer­
ences with fundamental rights of the preventive system designed by EU 
AML/CTF legislation to accommodate the international soft law in the 
ﬁeld. This system indeed requires the processing and exchange of 
personal data (e.g., in customer identiﬁcation, due diligence, and 
reporting duties) in order to be able to detect criminals who might 
hide behind the customers of an entity subject to the vigilance obliga­
tions of the Directive. To assess the problematic interaction of the last 
AML Directive with the rights in question, we should ﬁrst sketch out the 
legal regime of such rights in the EU. 
1. The Protection of the Right to Privacy and the Protection of 
Personal Data under International Law and EU Law 
The right to privacy can be deﬁned as the right to be protected from 
unjustiﬁed interferences of states and private agents in individuals’ 
private lives.221 Such illegal interferences may take various forms. Of 
particular relevance for the purposes of the present study are the 
violations of the right to privacy linked to the processing of personal 
data.222 As early as 1988, the U.N. Human Rights Committee recog­
218. This will not change under the reinforced cooperation established by the fourth 
AML/CTF Directive. 
219. 
220. Id. ¶ 85. 
221. See SUSAN MARKS & ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS LEXICON 262 (2005). 
222. It has been aptly noted that the right to privacy does not necessarily overlap with the 
protection of personal data. See Carlo Focarelli, LA PRIVACY: PROTEGGERE I DATI PERSONALI OGGI 36-37 
(2015); Juliane Kokott & Christoph Sobotta, The Distinction between Privacy and Data Protection in the 
Jurisprudence of the CJEU and the ECtHR, 3 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 222 (2013). 
2017] 1049
 
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
 
nized that such a right has important implications with respect to the 
processing and storage of personal data on computers and data­
bases.223 In particular, it observed that: 
The gathering and holding of personal information on comput­
ers, data banks and other devices, whether by public authorities 
or private individuals or bodies, must be regulated by law. 
Effective measures have to be taken by States to ensure that 
information concerning a person’s private life does not reach 
the hands of persons who are not authorized by law to receive, 
process and use it . . . .  In  order to have the most effective 
protection of his private life, every individual should have the 
right to ascertain in an intelligible form, whether, and if so, 
what personal data is stored in automatic data ﬁles, and for what 
purposes. Every individual should also be able to ascertain 
which public authorities or bodies control or may control their 
ﬁles.224 
With the advent of the digital era, the debate on the human rights 
implications of the processing of personal data became even more 
crucial. Upon mandate of the U.N. General Assembly, the Ofﬁce of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights drafted a report on the right to 
privacy in the digital era.225 Notably, this report emphasizes the need to 
address the possible human rights issues raised by the increasingly 
important role of databases.226 
The right to privacy is also protected under regional human rights 
instruments. In the context of the Council of Europe, the two most 
notable instruments are the Convention for the Protection of the 
Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data and 
the European Convention on Human Rights. In the EU legal system, 
the right to privacy and the protection of personal data are included 
among the general principles of EU law and are enshrined in Articles 7 
and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union as 
223. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 16: Article 17 (The Right to 
Respect of Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence, and Protection of Honour and Reputa­
tion), ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I) (Apr. 8, 1988). 
224. Id. 
225. U.N. Ofﬁce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, The Right to Privacy in the 
Digital Age, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/37 (June 30, 2014). 
226. Id. ¶ 14. 
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well as in Article 16 TFEU.227 In addition, the protection of personal 
data and the right of privacy ﬁnd express recognition in a number of 
EU secondary law instruments.228 More widely, the EU has attempted 
to square the storage and processing of personal data for security 
purposes with the protection of fundamental rights. This attitude was 
particularly evident during the negotiation of the so-called SWIFT 
Agreement,229 where EU institutions and, notably, the European Parlia­
ment, have striven for limiting the negative impact on fundamental 
rights of rules governing the exchange of personal ﬁnancial data. 
2. The Remaining Tensions between AML/CTF Law, the Right to 
Privacy, and Data Protection Law 
The European legislature has gradually attempted to reconcile AML 
legislation with the right to privacy. The existence of an EU interest to 
modulate data protection prerogatives for the purposes of AML/CTF 
prevention is acknowledged in the very text of the Directive, which 
states that “the processing of data” for those purposes “shall be consid­
ered as a matter of public interest under Directive 95/56EC.”230 
The new instrument addresses some of the concerns that the Euro­
pean Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) expressed in its opinion of 
July 2013 on the Commission’s proposal for the Fourth AML Direc­
tive.231 Most notably, the Directive now contains substantive provisions 
227. See generally GLORIA GONZ´ ALEZ FUSTER, THE EMERGENCE OF PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION AS 
A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF THE EU (2014). 
228. See, e.g., Regulation (EU) 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with regard to the Processing of Personal Data 
and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data 
Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L119) 1; Directive (EU) 2016/680, of the European Parlia­
ment and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data by Competent Authorities for the Purposes of the Prevention, 
Investigation, Detection or Prosecution of Criminal Offences or the Execution of Criminal 
Penalties, and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Council Framework Decision 
2008/977/JHA, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 89. 
229. Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the 
Processing and Transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United 
States for Purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme, 2010 O.J. (L 8) 11. 
230. Fourth AML/CTF Directive, supra note 101, art. 43 (emphasis added); Directive 
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection 
of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such 
Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, art. 13. 
231. Eur. Data Prot. Supervisor, Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on a Proposal 
for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Prevention of the Use of the Financial 
System for the Purpose of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, and a Proposal for a Regulation of the 
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that explicitly refer to the applicable EU data protection law as trans­
posed into national law and recall the principle of providing data 
subjects with information about the processing of data for AML/CTF 
purposes.
European Parliament and of the Council on Information on the Payer Accompanying Transfers of Funds (July 
4, 2013), https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/ﬁles/publication/13-07-04_money_laundering_en. 
pdf. 
232 It establishes a maximum temporal limit for the retention 
of data collected to comply with the record-keeping obligations after 
the end of the business relation with the customers (the data subjects) 
or after the date of an occasional transaction.233 Finally, Article 39 
stipulates that the obliged entities and their managers and employees 
shall not divulge the information reported to the FIUs in accordance 
with Article 33 and 34 of the same Directive.234 When enacting this 
prohibition, the member states may restrict the data’s subject right of 
access to personal data on condition that such a restriction (i) “consti­
tutes a necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society”; 
(ii) does not hinder the obliged entities and national authorities in the 
discharge of their reporting duties; (iii) and does not hamper the 
prevention and the repression of money laundering and terrorist 
ﬁnancing.235 
Nevertheless, other solutions’ provisions are far more controversial. 
First, member states are required to give FIUs maximum access to 
national databases (“ﬁnancial, administrative, and law enforcement 
information”);236 however, as with the Third Directive, no data protec­
tion provisions accompany this maximum access. Also, notwithstanding 
the clear indication from the EDPS, the Directive does not expressly 
clarify whether (and which) sensitive data within the meaning of 
Article 8(1) of Directive 95/46 have to be taken into account in 
carrying out CDD. 
Secondly, the weak safeguards for the right to access data are even 
more worrying: as observed early, under the Directive it is left to 
member states to adopt legislative measures restricting the right of 
access of the data subject due to the prohibition of tipping-off to the 
extent that such limitation “constitutes a necessary and proportionate 
measure in a democratic society.”237 Yet, the lack of further details can 
232. Fourth AML/CTF Directive, supra note 101, arts. 41(1)-(3). 
233. Id. art. 40(1). 
234. Id. art. 39(1). 
235. Id. art. 41(4). 
236. Id. art. 32(4). 
237. Id. art. 41(4). 
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result in undue discrepancies among member states, and it seems 
disproportionate to limit the access right in relation to those suspicious 
transactions reports that are later considered groundless and irrel­
evant. a matter on which the Directive is silent.238 This is a serious 
omission; the right to access is indeed protected by Article 8 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (the Charter),239 and any 
limitation must be strictly interpreted. The EU legislator, therefore, at 
least should have issued some guidelines as to when such limitation 
could be considered necessary and proportionate and mentioned that 
this limitation should be used on an exceptional basis.240 
Thirdly, the length of the retention period of the data is extremely 
problematic. Recital 44 and Article 40 of the Directive provide that 
obligated entities shall maintain the information obtained through due 
diligence measures as well as records of the transactions for at least ﬁve 
years after the end of the business relationship with their customer or 
after the date of an occasional transaction.241 Further, such a retention 
period may be extended by member states for an additional ﬁve years 
after a thorough assessment of the necessity and proportionality of 
further retention when this is considered to be necessary for the 
prevention, detection, or investigation of money laundering or terror­
ist ﬁnancing.242 In this respect, it has been observed that, in giving 
member states a large amount of leeway, the rules on the possible 
extension of the retention period raise serious proportionality con­
cerns.243 Therefore, it would have been better if, as the EDPS had 
suggested, the Fourth AML/CTF Directive provided for a possible 
extension of the retention period after a thorough assessment on a 
case-by-case basis or, at least, for speciﬁc guidelines as to the circum­
stances under which such an extension would be necessary.244 
Our take is that the choice of including only apodictic statements on 
the duration of the data retention period is all the more striking in view 
of the outcome of the recent jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU) on the right to privacy and the right to 
data protection. Particularly, it seems that the EU legislator ignored the 
238. See Eur. Data Prot. Supervisor, supra note 231, ¶ 65. 
239. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 391. 
240. Mitsilegas & Vavoula, supra note 8, at 281. 
241. Borlini, supra note 9, at 43. 
242. Id. 
243. Mitsilegas & Vavoula, supra note 8, at 281; see Eur. Data Prot. Supervisor, supra note 231, 
at 14. 
244. See Eur. Data Prot. Supervisor, supra note 231, at 14. 
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potent echo of the milestone ruling in Digital Rights.245 
Joined Cases C-293/12 & C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Minister for Commc’ns, 
Marine and Nat. Res., (Apr. 8, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document. 
jsf?docid=150642&doclang=EN. 
Although the 
ruling was rendered in a different context,246 the main motivations that 
led the court to hold that the EU legislature had exceeded the limits of 
the principle of proportionality in relation to certain provisions of the 
Charter (Articles 7, 8, and 52(1)) by adopting the Directive 2006/24247— 
and, hence, struck down the same Directive—seem staggeringly perti­
nent for the analysis of the Fourth AML/CTF Directive. Similarly to the 
latter act, the “material objective” of the data retention Directive is 
crime prevention, especially prevention of serious crimes like terror­
ism.248 In invalidating Directive 2006/24 because of its excessive inter­
ference with fundamental rights, the focus of the court’s reasoning was 
on its problematic rules on the deﬁnition of “serious crime” and the 
duration of the data retention period.249 The Directive lacked a deﬁni­
tion of “serious crime,” and, hence, left the provisions excessively 
generic.250 Furthermore, in the court’s reasoning, it was not possible to 
reconcile the excessive length of the retention period (i.e., a maximum 
of two years) with the stated aims of the Data Retention Directive. The 
reason being that the issue of proportionality—which plays a particu­
larly relevant role with respect to Articles 7 and 52 of the Charter—was 
not sufﬁciently addressed in this instrument.251 Therefore, the CJEU 
stated that the EU legislature had “exceeded the limits imposed by 
compliance with the principle of proportionality” for a practice—mass 
surveillance established by Directive 2006/24—that interfered with 
245. 
246. Space precludes a full account of the case. See, e.g., Oreste Pollicino & Marco Bassinio, 
The Luxembourg Sense of the Internet: Towards a Right to Digital Privacy?, in THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY: 
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE 2014 223, 223-46 (Giuliana Ziccardi Capaldo 
ed., 2015); Arianna Vedaschi & Valerio Lubello, Data Retention and Its Implications for the Fundamen­
tal Right to Privacy: A European Perspective, 20 TILBURG L. REV. 14 (2015). 
247. Directive 2006/24/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 
2006 on the Retention of Data Generated or Processed in Connection with the Provision of 
Publicly Available Electronic Communications Services or of Public Communications Networks 
and Amending Directive 2002/58/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 105) 54. 
248. The court indeed assessed the proportionality of the Directive in light of its “material 
objective”—crime prevention—rather than its stated objective—market harmonization. See Joined 
Cases C-293/12 & C-594/12, supra note 245, ¶¶ 56-59. It is no secret that the legislative process 
that led to the adoption of the Directive found strong impetus in the aftermath of the terrorist 
attacks in Madrid in March 2004 and in London in July 2005. 
249. Id. ¶¶ 46-56. 
250. Id. ¶ 57. 
251. Borlini, supra note 9, at 44. 
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fundamental rights, especially the right to privacy and the right to data 
protection.252 Such a conclusion mirrors Advocate General (AG) Cruz 
Villalon’s´  reﬂections in his opinion in Digital Rights. Indeed, the AG 
noted that: 
[A] human being lives out his existence over a period which is 
by deﬁnition limited where the past, his own history and in the 
ﬁnal analysis his memory, and the present, the more or less 
immediate lived experience, the awareness of what he is in the 
process of living through, converge . . . .  What appears unques­
tionable is the possibility of distinguishing between the percep­
tion of present time and the perception of the past. In each of 
those perceptions, an individual’s awareness of his own life, his 
‘private life’ particularly, as a ‘recorded’ life may play a part. 
Further, there is a difference according to whether that ‘re­
corded life’ is the one which is perceived as his present or the 
one which is experienced as his own history.253 
NORBERT ELIAS, DU TEMPS (1998); HARTMUT ROSA, ACCE´L ERATION: UNE CRITIQUE SOCIALE DU 
TEMPS (2013).
AG Cruz Villalon´  went on to argue that such considerations could be 
applied to the analysis of the proportionality of the data retention 
obligation as deﬁned by the Data Retention Directive. In particular, he 
observed that: 
if the principle of retaining all that personal documentation for 
a certain period of time is considered lawful, it remains to ask 
whether it is inevitable, that is to say, necessary, for it to be 
imposed on individuals over a period which covers not only 
“the present time” but also “historical time.”254 
252. Id. 
253. Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalo´n (Dec. 12, 2013), Joined Cases C-293/12 & 
C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Minister for Commc’ns, Marine and Nat. Res., ¶ 146. See 
also 
 
254. Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalo´n,  supra note 253, ¶ 147. Also, “it may be 
considered that a retention period for personal data ‘which is measured in months’ is to be clearly 
distinguished from a period ‘which is measured in years.’ The ﬁrst period would correspond to 
that falling within what is perceived as present life and the second to that falling within life 
perceived as memory. The interference with the right to privacy is, from that perspective, different 
in each case and the necessity of both types of interference must be capable of being justiﬁed.” Id. 
¶ 148. 
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He then concluded that “[a]lthough the necessity of the interfer­
ence in the dimension of present time seems to be sufﬁciently justi­
ﬁed,” he found “no justiﬁcation for an interference extending to 
historical time,”255 and that, in the various views defending the Data 
Retention Directive, he did not ﬁnd “any sufﬁcient justiﬁcation for not 
limiting the data retention period to be established by the member 
states to less than one year.”256 
The ruling in Digital Rights was reinforced by another important 
judgment recently issued by the ECJ. In Tele 2,257 
Joined Cases C-203/15 & C-698/15, Tele2 Sverige AB v. Post-och telestyrelsen, Sec’y of 
State for the Home Dep’t v. Watson (Dec. 21, 2016))016 E.C.R.his date, but incper under 21.5.2. 
Online sources seem to indicate eh ughout hte ent. I’I was thinking the document s, http://curia. 
europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=186492&doclang=EN. 
the court was once 
again seized to assess the consistency of the data retention obligations 
with EU law. First, it assessed whether a domestic measure imposing on 
electronic communication service providers the obligation to retain 
personal data is consistent with Article 15(1) of the Directive 2002/58/ 
EC,258 as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC259 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009, read in conjunc­
tion with Articles 7, 8, and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU. This provision provides that: 
Member States may adopt legislative measures to restrict the 
scope of the rights and obligations provided for in Article 5, 
Article 6, Article 8(1), (2), (3) and (4), and Article 9 of this 
Directive when such restriction constitutes a necessary, appro­
priate and proportionate measure within a democratic society 
to safeguard national security (i.e. State security), defence, 
public security, and the prevention, investigation, detection 
255. Id. ¶ 149. 
256. Id. (emphasis added). The AG went on, stating that: “In other words, and with all the 
caution that this aspect of the review of proportionality always requires, no argument was able to 
convince me of the need to extend data retention beyond one year.” Id. 
257. 
258. Directive 2002/58/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 
concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic 
Communications Sector (Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications), 2002 O.J. 
(L 201) 37. 
259. Directive 2009/136/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 Novem­
ber 2009 Amending Directive 2002/22/EC on Universal Service and Users’ Rights Relating to 
Electronic Communications Networks and Services, Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the Process­
ing of Personal Data and the Protection Of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector and 
Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on Cooperation between National Authorities Responsible for 
the Enforcement of Consumer Protection Laws, 2009 O.J. (L 337) 11. 
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and prosecution of criminal offences or of unauthorised use of 
the electronic communication system, as referred to in Article 
13(1) of Directive [95/46]. To this end, Member States may, 
inter alia, adopt legislative measures providing for the retention 
of data for a limited period justiﬁed on the grounds laid down 
in this paragraph. All the measures referred to in this para­
graph shall be in accordance with the general principles of 
Community law, including those referred to in Article 6(1) and 
(2) of the Treaty on European Union.260 
In the court’s view, this disposition should be construed as an 
exception to the general prohibition to store personal data.261 In 
addition, the court emphasized that the measures referred to in Article 
15(1) should be consistent with the general principles of EU law.262 It 
follows that such a provision shall be read in light of the right to privacy 
and protection of personal data under Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union.263 Bearing this in mind, 
the court concluded that the sweeping obligation to retain personal 
data enacted by Sweden ran afoul of Article 15(1) of the Directive 
2002/58/EC, as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC.264 
The second preliminary question concerned the consistency with the 
abovementioned Article 15 of a measure conferring on national authori­
ties the power to have unrestricted access to personal data.265 In this 
respect, the court ﬁrst observed that national authorities should be 
allowed to access such data only in accordance with the principle of 
proportionality.266 It follows that the access to such data should be 
subject to substantive and procedural provisions.267 Notably, the court 
held that: 
[I]t is essential that access of the competent national authori­
ties to retained data should, as a general rule, except in cases of 
validly established urgency, be subject to a prior review carried 
out either by a court or by an independent administrative body, 
260. Joined Cases C-203/15 & C-698/15, supra note 257, ¶ 11. 
261. Id. ¶ 82. 
262. Id. ¶ 91. 
263. Id. ¶ 92. 
264. Id. ¶ 112. 
265. Id. ¶ 114. 
266. Id. ¶ 115. 
267. Id. ¶ 118. 
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and that the decision of that court or body should be made 
following a reasoned request by those authorities submitted, 
inter alia, within the framework of procedures for the preven­
tion, detection or prosecution of crime.268 
In light of the foregoing considerations, the court had little difﬁculty 
in concluding that Article 15 precluded member states from conferring 
such far-reaching powers on their national authorities.269 
Arguably, these decisions should be considered as strong warnings 
regarding any future EU legislation in the ﬁeld, especially considering 
that the EDPS also expressed concerns on the length of the data 
retention period. However, it should be noted that the Fourth AML/ 
CTF Directive did not fully take into account the ﬁndings of the court. 
In fact, the deﬁnition of money laundering contained in the Fourth 
AML/CTF Directive rests upon an open-ended deﬁnition of “serious” 
predicate “crimes,” which might turn out to be inconsistent with the 
principle of legal certainty.270 What is more, the extensible ﬁve-year data 
retention period contained in the same Directive might be at variance 
with the proportionality principle.271 
Finally, the European Commission’s272 call for an enhanced ex­
change of ﬁnancial intelligence among EU FIUs and third country 
FIUs and among FIUs and the private sector may compound the 
privacy and data protection concerns raised by the Fourth AML/CTF 
Directive.273 In this context, the Commission remarks that interna­
tional standards now emphasize the importance of extending the scope 
of the access to the information available to FIUs, and this will be 
achieved by means of an amendment of the Fourth AML/CTF Direc­
tive.274 Yet, in another landmark ruling on the right to data protection, 
the Court of Justice had already held that the transfer of everyday 
personal data to third countries on large scale without substantive 
assessment of the adequacy of their data protection framework is 
incompatible with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.275 
Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r (Oct. 6, 2015), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ 
legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62014CJ0362&from=EN. 
In this 
268. Id. ¶ 120. 
269. Id. ¶ 125. 
270. Borlini, supra note 9, at 45. 
271. See Eur. Data Prot. Supervisor, supra note 231, at 14. 
272. See European Comm’n, Action Plan to Strengthen the Fight against Terrorist Financing, supra 
note 128. 
273. Mitsilegas & Vavoula, supra note 8, at 291. 
274. Id. at 291-92. 
275. 
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respect, it is welcome that the European Commission seems to have put 
matters right in its last Proposal for a directive amending the Fourth 
AML/CTF Directive, which does not contain the above referred 
modiﬁcation.276 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The last twenty-ﬁve years have seen an upsurge of legislative and 
regulatory instruments aimed at contrasting newly perceived global 
threats—those of money laundering and terrorist ﬁnancing. An excep­
tional normative production of international standards took place, 
“largely the outcome of a broad political consensus and synergies 
between the global, regional and national level,”277 as well as of the 
economic analysis of laundering crimes and AML/CTF regulation. In 
this context, the FATF “soft law” standards had a tremendous impact 
on domestic and international AML/CTF rules. It is not by chance that 
the FATF has been deﬁned as “the single most inﬂuential international 
body in terms of formulation of anti-money-laundering policy and 
mobilization of global awareness of the complex issues involved in 
countering this sophisticated form of criminality.”278 
Our investigation of the “genealogy” of the international AML/CTF 
norms, their criminological and economic rationales and the resulting 
normative prescriptions suggests that it is unsurprising that a highly 
detailed legal framework, such as the current AML/CTF law, has found 
its ﬁrst and natural “body” in a soft law instrument adopted by a 
technocratic body and only thereafter has been translated into binding 
international legal instruments. Flexibility and openness to change 
typical of soft law are particularly important in a ﬁeld where domestic 
laws and regulations, as well as enforcement actions, have to keep pace 
with money launderers and terrorist ﬁnanciers to remain effective. 
Further, soft law instruments are generally considered more suitable to 
regulate technical matters because nations are generally wary of under­
taking excessively stringent commitments immediately. 
FATF standards and hard law have inﬂuenced one another. On the 
one hand, FATF standards have shaped the content of hard law in the 
AML/CTF ﬁeld. On the other hand, domestic and regional legal 
276. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Directive (EU) 
2015/849 on the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purposes of Money Laundering or 
Terrorist Financing and Amending Directive 2009/101/EC, COM (2016) 450 ﬁnal (July 5, 2016). 
277. MITSILEGAS, supra note 112, at 312. 
278. GILMORE, supra note 15, at 89. 
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regimes incorporating FATF standards have strengthened the legiti­
macy and relevance of the FATF. 
The EU was the ﬁrst regional polity to play an active role in shaping 
global standards and has constantly sought to keep pace with AML/ 
CTF global soft law. Yet, the implementation of such standards has 
often been fraught with difﬁculties.279 
First, the accommodation of the criminal and preventive compo­
nents of international AML/CTF standards within the EU has followed 
two rather diverging paths. Indeed, the adoption of an EU criminal 
legislation on money laundering has been impeded so far by the 
member states’ reluctance to concede the EU more powers in the 
criminal law ﬁeld, particularly in harmonizing the deﬁnition and 
sanctions of certain crimes. As a result, whilst harmonization of crimi­
nal systems, foreseen in Article 83 TFEU, is still a process in develop­
ment,280 and the persisting differences in the member states’ legisla­
tions on the deﬁnition of money laundering and sanctions have led to 
difﬁculties for judicial and police cooperation and cross-border investi­
gations. The EU has so far adopted four directives (and a series of other 
measures) on prevention that have been justiﬁed by the need to 
accommodate the FATF Recommendations in EU law. 
With its new provisions designed to increase the effectiveness and 
efﬁciency of the AML/CTF preventive framework, the 2015 Directive 
fully incorporated the FATF Recommendations on prevention. Besides 
representing one of the key actions of the European Security Agenda,281 
the Directive is a salient example of large-scale public-private security 
cooperation and an important but rather discrete case of data-led ﬁght 
against terrorism. 
Second, the incorporation of FATF soft law standards into EU 
legislation often does not sit comfortably with fundamental freedoms 
and rights protected under EU law. Such tensions are further exacer­
bated by the circumstance that, within the EU, the prevention of 
money laundering and (even more so) terrorist ﬁnancing is increas­
ingly viewed as a security issue. In Jyske Bank and Ordre des Barreaux, the 
Court of Justice of the European Union found that the ﬁght against 
279. See Mitsilegas & Gilmore, supra note 94, at 140. 
280. As documented, a new thrust for the adoption of EU criminal instruments in the 
AML/CTF ﬁeld has followed the publication of the Commission Action Plan for Strengthening 
the Fight against Terrorist Financing last February. See PEERS, supra note 116, at 813-30. 
281. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: The European Agenda on Security, COM 
(2015) 185 ﬁnal (Apr. 28, 2015). 
1060 [Vol. 48 
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COUNTER TERRORIST FINANCING
 
money laundering and terrorist ﬁnancing is an objective of general 
interest. Therefore, it concluded that AML/CTF measures may intro­
duce proportionate and reasonable restrictions to the freedom to 
provide services and the right to a fair trial. Striking a similar balance 
between the AML/CTF legislation and the fundamental rights to 
privacy and data protection seems far more problematic. Whereas the 
data protection rules as formulated in the ﬁnal text of the 2015 
Directive represent a signiﬁcant step forward compared to the previous 
regime, states still enjoy a signiﬁcant degree of discretion. 
The above-described landscape displays the limits of adopting the 
normative outcome of an organization like the FATF within the wider 
EU legal framework with a view to responding to security threats. The 
tension between the EU legislation incorporating the global AML/CTF 
soft law and the right to privacy is likely to remain unsolved. The recent 
proposal of an amendment to the Fourth AML/CTF Directive (so-
called “Fifth AML/CTF Directive”)282 seems to conﬁrm such proposi­
tion. It sufﬁces to note that in its recent opinion on the implications on 
data protection of the proposed amendments,283 
Eur. Data Prot. Supervisor, EDPS Opinion on a Commission Proposal Amending Directive (EU) 
2015/849 and Directive 2009/101/EC: Access to Beneﬁcial Ownership Information and Data Protection 
Implications (Feb. 2, 2017), https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/ﬁles/publication/17-02-02_opinion_ 
aml_en.pdf. 
the EDPS expresses 
several and signiﬁcant concerns about the fact that the proposed 
amendments would also introduce other policy purposes—other than 
countering money laundering and terrorism ﬁnancing—that do not 
282. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Directive (EU) 
2015/849 on the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purposes of Money Laundering or 
Terrorist Financing and Amending Directive 2009/101/EC, COM (2016) 450 ﬁnal (July 5, 2016). On 
November 8, 2016, the European Economic and Financial Affairs Council (known as “EcoFin”), 
met to discuss the European Commission’s action plan against money laundering and terrorist 
ﬁnancing activity. The focus was on the further amendments to the Fourth AML/CTF Directive, 
proposed in July 2016, when the action plan was published. As a result of those discussions and 
additional input received from some parliamentary committees, amendments to the original 
Directive adopted in 2015 have been proposed in a separate directive, referred to as the “Fifth” 
AML/CTF Directive. The new instrument seems to take a stricter approach than before to the 
problem of effectively countering money laundering and terrorism ﬁnancing. In this respect, 
among other measures proposed, it focuses on new channels and modalities used to transfer 
illegal funds to the legal economy (e.g., virtual currencies, money exchange platforms, etc.). The 
proposal has not yet been agreed so no changes have been made to the 2015 Directive. It is 
understood that the European Presidency is aiming for agreement on the amendments proposed 
by the ﬁrst months of 2017 so that negotiations with the European Parliament can start in the 
same year. 
283. 
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seem clearly identiﬁed.284 
According to the EDPS, the amendments, in particular, raise the 
question as to why certain forms of invasive personal data processing, 
acceptable in relation to AML/CTF goals, are necessary outside of 
those contexts and whether they are proportionate. As far as proportion­
ality is concerned, the amendments would depart from the risk-based 
approach adopted by the current version of the AML/CTF Directive as 
the higher risk for anti-money-laundering, terrorism ﬁnancing, and 
associated predicate offenses would not allow its timely detection and 
assessment.285 Moreover, they also remove existing safeguards that 
would have granted a certain degree of proportionality, for example, in 
setting the conditions for FIUs access to information on ﬁnancial 
transactions.286 Last, and most importantly, the amendments signiﬁ­
cantly broaden access to beneﬁcial ownership information by both 
competent authorities and the public, as a policy tool to facilitate and 
optimize enforcement of tax obligations. The EDPS opines that this 
solution may give rise to signiﬁcant and unnecessary risks for the 
individual rights to privacy and data protection.287 
284. Id. at 8-10. 
285. Id. at 12. 
286. Id. at 12-13. 
287. Id. at 13-14. 
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